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TRANSFERENCE OF LIABILITY:
EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL
MISCONDUCT BY THERAPISTS
Linda Mabus Jorgenson
Pamela K Sutherland
Steven B. Bisbing*
INTRODUCTION
Sex between psychotherapists and patients is deemed
unethical by major mental health organizations, is unani-
mously considered to constitute malpractice, and in some juris-
dictions constitutes a criminal offense.' Professional organiza-
tions and commentators have begun to recognize that sexual
contact between other professionals-physicians, lawyers, and
clergy-and their patients or clients is unprofessional, at a
minimum. Despite proscriptions against such relationships,
sexual misconduct by professionals continues. One collection of
self-reporting surveys recounts that from 2 to 14% of male
therapists and 0.3 to 3% of female therapists reported engag-
ing in some form of sexual contact with at least one patient.
* © 1995. Attorney Jorgenson (MA., J.D.) is a partner in the law firm of
Spero & Jorgenson, P.C., Cambridge, Mass. Attorney Sutherland (J.D.) is of
counsel to Cuddy Bixby, Boston, Mass. Dr. Bisbing (J.D., Psy. D.) is a forensic
psychologist in private practice in Takoma Park, Maryland. This Article is adapted
from a chapter in the authors' forthcoming book, Abuse of Trust: Sexual
Misconduct by Fiduciaries-A Guide to Litigating Abuse by Professionals (1995).
The authors wish to thank Nancy Flynn Barvick, Kathaleen Wahl and Gary
Schoener for their help and insights.
' See generally Linda M. Jorgenson et al., The Furor over Psychotherapist-Pa-
tient Sexual Contact: New Solutions to an Old Problem, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV.
645 (1991).
2 See, e.g., AMA Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, Sexual Misconduct in
the Practice of Medicine, 266 JAMA 2741 (1991) (sexual contact between physician
and patient is unethical); see also Linda M. Jorgenson & Pamela K. Sutherland,
Fiduciary Theory Applied to Personal Dealings: Attorney-Client Sexual Contact, 45
ARK. L. REV. 459 (1992).
3 GARY R. SCHOENER ET AL., PSYCHOTHERAPISTS' SEXUAL INVOLVEMENT WITH
CLIENTS: INTERVENTION & PREVENTION 39 (1989); see also Kenneth Pope, Thera-
pist-Patient Sexual Involvement: A Review of the Literature, 10 CLINICAL PSYCHOL.
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The primary legal remedy plaintiffs pursue is a civil law-
suit alleging negligence based on professional malpractice. A
majority of malpractice actions against therapists are based on
allegations of negligent mishandling of the psychological phe-
nomena known as transference.' One court, noting the dan-
gers of such relationships, emphasized that:
A sexual relationship between therapist and patient cannot be
viewed separately from the therapeutic relationship that has devel-
oped between them. The transference phenomenon makes it impossi-
ble that the patient will have the same emotional response to sexual
contact with the therapist that he or she could have to sexual con-
tact with other persons.'
While mishandling of transference often results in sexual
contact between the therapist and patient, malpractice can
REV. 477 (1990).
' See, e.g., Weaver v. Union Carbide Corp., 378 S.E.2d 105, 106-07 (W. Va.
1989) ("[Slexual intimacy with a patient . . . is a form of malpractice permitting
recovery of damages for emotional distress and other harm resulting from the
malpractice. The basis of the malpractice is the trust relationship that arises from
such counseling services, which are designed to improve the mental and emotional
well-being of the patient." (footnote omitted)); ROBERT SIMON, CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY
& THE LAW 22-23, 414-19 (2d ed. 1992). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 299A (1956). The therapist's liability to her patient may extend even after
therapy has ended. For a discussion of post-termination liability, see generally
Paul Appelbaum & Linda Jorgenson, Psychotherapist-Patient Sexual Contact After
Termination of Treatment: An Analysis & A Proposal, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1466
(1991).
' See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1986); Zipkin v.
Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. 1968) (en banc). Transference has been described
as "the term used by psychiatrists and psychologists to denote a patient's emotion-
al reaction to a therapist and is 'generally applied to the projection of feelings,
thoughts and wishes onto the analyst, who has come to represent some person
from the patient's past'" Simmons, 805 F.2d at 1364 (citation omitted). Positive
transference may be experienced by the patient in the form of feelings of erotic
attraction toward the therapist. See generally SIGMUND FREUD, Further Recommen-
dations in the Technique of Psycho-Analysis: Observations on Transference-Love, in
2 COLLECTED PAPERS 377 (Joan S. Riviere trans., 1959).
Transference is not limited to psychotherapeutic relationships but may arise
in any professional relationship in which there is a degree of trust, confidence or
good faith placed in the person in the position of relative authority. For example,
the relationship that may develop in a law office between a male associate and an
older partner can be similar to that between a son and a father. Other examples
of professional relationships in which the trusting party may experience transfer-
ence toward the fiduciary include patient or student relationships with physicians,
chiropractors and teachers. See generally MICHAEL PECK, THE MEANING OF PSY-
CHOANALYSIS 93-94 (1950); ANDREW WATSON, PSYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS 2-8 (1978).
6 L.L. v. Medical Protective Co., 362 N.W.2d 174, 178 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984).
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occur due to the therapist's mishandling of the transference
alone. In an early psychotherapist malpractice case, Zipkin v.
Freeman, the court stated:
Once Dr. Freeman started to mishandle the transference phenome-
non .... it was inevitable that trouble was ahead. It is pretty clear
from the medical evidence that the damage would have been done to
Mrs. Zipkin even if the trips outside the state were carefully chaper-
oned, the swimming done with suits on, and if there had been ball-
room dancing instead of sexual relations
Another court stated, "[w]e see no reason for distinguishing
between this type of malpractice [the mishandling of trans-
ference] and others, such as improper administration of a drug
or a defective operation. In each situation, the essence of the
claim is the doctor's departure from proper standards of medi-
cal practice."'
Most lawsuits brought by patients and clients against
professionals focus on the liability of the professional individu-
al. Many professionals-particularly lawyers and physi-
cians-are employed by or otherwise affiliated with other pro-
fessionals. This Article examines the tort doctrines that render
employers liable for the misconduct of their employees. It fo-
cuses on two different legal approaches to liability: vicarious
and direct. Under the theory of vicarious liability-known in
the context of employer-employee relationships as the respon-
deat superior doctrine-an employer can be vicariously liable
to a third party for the wrongful acts of its employee or agent
without the injured party proving fault on the part of the em-
ployer. Under certain exceptions to the respondeat superior
doctrine-such as the common-carrier exception-vicarious
liability may be imputed to the employer regardless of whether
the employee acted within the course of his or her employment.
In contrast, direct liability involves the employer's own negli-
gence in hiring, retaining and supervising employees. Direct
liability also may result from the employer's failure to uphold
its duties toward its clients and others.
The application of employer liability tort doctrines varies
436 S.W.2d at 761.
' Cotton v. Kambly, 300 N.W.2d 627, 628-29 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
' Respondeat superior means "let the master answer." BLACK'S LAW DICTIO-
NARY 1311 (6th ed. 1990).
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widely among jurisdictions." A court's decision may turn up-
on subtle variations in the interpretation of issues such as
whether the employee was acting within the scope of his or her
employment or with an intent to benefit the employer. Thus,
on a similar set of facts, an employer may be found liable in
one jurisdiction and not liable in another.
Liability also may be imposed when the employer-employ-
ee relationship has a less traditional configuration such as in
supervisory or consultant relationships." Additionally, the va-
riety of modern medical care delivery systems provides ample
ground for the imposition of liability on several agency-related
theories, including vicarious liability for the wrongful acts of
staff physicians associated with Health Maintenance Organiza-
tions ("HMOs"),"2 apparent agency between an HMO and its
staff members," and institutional corporate negligence.'4
Even if a plaintiff establishes vicarious liability, certain
There are no commonly accepted texts or guidelines focused on employer re-
sponsibility or risk management in connection with sexual misconduct. Schoener
and others have published a series of checklists of administrative safeguards,
which, although helpful in risk management, generally are not accepted enough to
constitute a standard of care. See SCHOENER ET AL., supra note 3, at 455-58.
Schoener also reviewed other sources of advice and standards on employer and
supervisor liability and risk management. See Gary R. Schoener, Employ-
er/Supervisor Liability and Risk Management: An Administrator's View, in BREACH
OF TRUST: SEXUAL EXPLOITATION BY HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS AND CLERGY
300, 312 (John C. Gonsiorek ed., 1995). The Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations ("JCAHO") has constructed peer review and credentialing
standards for hospitals. The theories of liability and agency relationships used in
the hospital context, which are based on the JCAHO standards, have been extend-
ed to mental health and drug abuse residential programs and health maintenance
organizations ("HIMOs"). Katherine Benesch & Michael D. Roth, Peer Review and
Credentialing-Recent Liability Developments, in LIABILITY ISSUES FOR HEALTH
CARE PROVIDERS IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT A-151 to A-152 (ABA Section of
Tort & Insurance Practice and the Division for Prof. Educ. eds., 1994). Other
health care providers standards, however, are not as widely favored. HIMOs, for
example, choose to seek review and accreditation by the JCAHO. Id. at A-149.
Churches and religious institutions have no single, broadly accepted standard
for handling sexual misconduct cases beyond their own internal rules and canons.
Reverend Marie Fortune provides some standards for handling cases once they are
discovered, but no clear models exist regarding methods of handling such cases.
See generally MARIE FORTUNE, IS NOTHING SACRED? (1992).
n See infra text accompanying notes 247-56.
' Sloan v. Metro Health Council, 516 N.E.2d 1104, 1108 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
' Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229, 1234-35 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1988).
14 Harrell v. Total Health Care, Inc., 781 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 1989) (en bane).
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types of employers may be immune to such suits. For example,
governmental employers, such as veterans hospitals or medical
facilities located on military bases, may avoid or limit liability
under the doctrine of governmental immunity. Federal and
state tort claims acts along with recent case law, however,
have restricted the protection of governmental tort immuni-
ty.'5 In addition, private non-profit hospitals also may benefit
from limited liability through charitable immunity statutes.
While some states provide total immunity to most non-prof-
its," the trend at the state level is toward replacing chari-
table immunity statutes with liability caps." The degree to
which charitable immunity still applies, therefore, varies from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction with recovery amounts dependent
upon the statutory limits of the particular jurisdiction. 8 Some
states also impose notice requirements 9 or abbreviated stat-
utes of limitation periods in actions against public hospitals."
16 See, e.g., Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1846(b), 2671-2178, 2680
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992), which waives sovereign immunity and allows the United
States to be sued for money damages arising from personal injury caused by
the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Govern-
ment while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be
liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the
act or omission occurred.
Id. § 2672.
'1 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-7 (West 1994) (disallowing recovery in
negligence by "beneficiaries" of the works of non-profit charitable organizations).
But see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-8 (allowing recovery up to $250,000 for hospitals
only).
'" See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38 (Michie 1994) (limiting liability of charita-
ble hospitals "for negligence or other tort" to $1 million).
1 Massachusetts, for example, abolished the charitable immunity doctrine but
capped liability at $20,000 for "tort[s] committed in the course of any activity
carried on to accomplish directly the charitable purposes of such corporation."
MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 231, § 85K (West 1987). The cap does not apply to pri-
marily commercial activity carried on by charitable institutions. Id. The cap has
come under attack as failing to provide sufficient compensation to render the stat-
ute financially meaningful to plaintiffs. See English v. New England Med. Ctr.,
541 N.E.2d 329, 333 (Mass. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990). Massachu-
setts courts, however, have ruled that adjustments to the cap are a matter for
legislative determination. See id. The Massachusetts liability cap has been held
applicable to recoveries for intentionally tortious conduct as well as negligent torts.
See St. Clair v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 521 N.E.2d 1044 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988).
In New Jersey, charitable organizations are completely immune from liability
for negligent torts. N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-7 (providing that "beneficiaries"
of the works of charitable organizations may not recover in negligence).
" See, e.g., MASS. GEN. L. ch. 258 (providing a six-month notice requirement).
' In Texas, for example, a plaintiff has only six months in which to file a
1995]
BROOKLYN LAW REVlIEW
Plaintiffs' attorneys therefore must familiarize themselves with
local statutes and liability caps to insure maximum recovery
for their clients.
I. EMPLOYERS' VIcARIous LIABILITY
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is
liable for an employee's wrongful or negligent act committed
within the scope of employment.2' Courts initially determine
whether an employer-employee relationship exists.' If so,
they next inquire into whether the employee acted within the
scope of his or her employment. The standard analysis used to
determine an employee's scope of employment is set forth in
section 228 of the Restatement of AgencyY Some jurisdictions,
rejecting the harsh results of the Restatement test, have held
employers liable for their employees' torts through alternate
theories such as job-created authority or enterprise liability.24
claim, and recovery is limited to the amount of funds remaining in the fund over-
seen by the Board of Regents. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.101
(West 1994).
21 W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 70, at 465
(5th ed. 1984).
[Scope of employment] refers to those acts which are so closely connected
with what the servant is employed to do, and so fairly and reasonably
incidental to it, that they may be regarded as methods, even though
quite improper ones, of carrying out the objectives of the employment.
As in the case of the existence of the relation itself, many factors
enter into the question: the time, place and purpose of the act, and its
similarity to what is authorized; whether it is one commonly done by
such servants; the extent of departure from normal methods; the previous
relation between the parties; whether the master had reason to expect
that such an act would be done; and many other considerations.... fMn
general, a servants conduct is within the scope of his employment if it is
of the kind which he is employed to perform, occurs substantially within
the authorized limits of time and space, and is actuated, at least in part,
by a purpose to serve the master.
Id. at 502 (footnotes omitted).
' See, e.g., Ross v. Texas One Partnership, 796 S.W.2d 206, 211 (Tex. Ct. App.
1990) (finding that security company was an independent contractor precluded
apartment owner from respondeat superior liability); see also infra notes 25-30 and
accompanying text.
' See infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text for a basic explanation of the
Restatement test, and notes 33-64 and accompanying text for its application.
24 See infra notes 65-102 and accompanying text for a discussion of these theo-
ries and their application.
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A. Respondeat Superior
1. Determination of Employee Status
When determining whether a person is an employee,
courts often look to the employer's degree of control over the
workerY A key factor is which party controls the "methods
and means by which the work is to be done."26 Other factors
courts consider include the type of occupation involved; the
skill required to perform the occupation; whether the employer
withheld taxes from the employee's pay; whether the employee
was on the payroll; whether the employee received any benefits
through the employer; and the general nature of the relation-
ship between the putative employee and the employer.
Employers arguing against liability sometimes claim that
the person committing the misconduct is not an employee but
an independent contractor. Generally, unlike an employee, an
independent contractor determines whether and how to per-
form a particular duty.' Radiologists, anesthesiologists and
emergency room physicians frequently practice as independent
' See Lazo v. Mak's Trading Co., 199 A.D.2d 165, 166, 605 N.Y.S.2d 272, 273-
74 (1st Dep't 1993) (holding that as a matter of law, itinerant workers hired to
unload rice for the defendant were not employees because defendant controlled nei-
ther method nor means by which work was done), affd, 84 N.Y.2d 896, 644
N.E.2d 1350, 620 N.Y.S.2d 794 (1994).
20 Id. at 166, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 273-74; see also In re Morton, 284 N.Y. 167, 172,
30 N.E.2d 369, 371 (1940) (stating that "'the distinction between an employee and
an independent contractor has been said to be the difference between one who
undertakes to achieve an agreed result and to accept the directions of his employ-
er as to the manner in which the result shall be accomplished, and one who
agrees to achieve a certain result but is not subject to the orders of the employer
as to the means which are used." (citations omitted)).
27 Lazo, 199 A.D.2d at 166-67, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 273 (nothing in type of work,
skill involved, payment, or general nature of relationship pointed to control); see
also Arthur v. St. Peters Hosp., 405 A.2d 443, 444-45 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1979) (discussing various factors that go into "degree of control" determination); In
re Morton, 284 N.Y. at 173, 30 N.E.2d at 371.
Lazo, 199 A.D.2d at 166, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 274; see also Arthur, 405 A.2d at
445 (holding that employer of independent contractor may nevertheless be liable if
contractor acted with apparent authority); Corleto v. Shore Memorial Hosp., 350
A.2d 534, 537 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975) (stating that proof an "employee"
was an independent contractor is good defense to vicarious liability but holding
that liability may attach directly for placing an incompetent contractor in a posi-
tion to do harm).
1995]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
contractors for hospitals.29  Independent Practice Model
HMOs, which contract with professionals to provide services to
subscribers, typically rely on the independent contractor de-
fense."0
Assuming the plaintiff establishes that the defendant is an
employee, the plaintiff then must prove that the defendant
acted within the scope of employment. The second part of the
respondeat superior inquiry determines whether and how a
plaintiff may meet this requirement.
2. Scope of Employment: The Restatement Test
What constitutes the scope of an employee's employment
remains in contention. The definition varies on a state-by-
state, and even a case-by-case, basis."' Courts often apply
some version of the test set forth in section 228 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Agency to determine whether an act falls
within an employee's scope of employment. 2 The Restatement
' Martell v. St. Charles Hosp., 137 Misc. 2d 980, 991, 523 N.Y.S.2d 342, 351
(Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1987) ('[Ilt is not at all uncommon . . . to have emer-
gency rooms operated by independent contractors.").
" For a more thorough discussion of HMO liability, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 279-306.
" Prosser notes:
This highly indefinite [language] which sometimes is varied with "in the
course of employment," is so devoid of meaning in itself that its very
vagueness has been of value in permitting a desirable degree of flexibility
in decisions. It is obviously no more than a bare formula to cover the
unordered and unauthorized acts of the servant for which it is found to
be expedient to charge the master with liability, as well as to exclude
other acts for which it is not. It refers to those acts which are so closely
connected with what the servant is employed to do, and so fairly and
reasonably incidental to it, that they may be regarded as methods, even
though quite improper ones, of carrying out the objectives of the employ-
ment.
KEETON, supra note 21, § 70 at 460-61 (4th ed. 1971).
" The Restatement defines the test as follows:
1. Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only
if:
a. it is of the kind he is employed to perform;
b. it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space lim-
its;
c. it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master;
and
d. if force is intentionally used by the servant against another, the
use of force is not unexpected by the master.
1428 [Vol. 60: 1421
EMPLOYER LIABILITY
test requires the imposition of liability when the conduct is of
the kind the employee was hired to perform, is motivated by a
purpose to serve the employer, and occurs within the work
time and space limits (usually during work hours and on the
premises).33 Various courts construe this test differently or
modify it by applying a number of approaches to determine
whether an act falls within the scope of employment.
Some courts have interpreted the first element of the Re-
statement test-that the employee's conduct be "of the kind he
2. Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is
different in kind from that authorized, far beyond the authorized time or
space limits, or too little actuated by a purpose to serve the master.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958).
The Restatement test is essentially a formulation of public policy concerns that
may appeal to a court's sense of equity when determining whether an employer is
responsible under a given set of facts. It often has been construed differently by
different courts, and, in the area of sexual torts there is no consistency based on
any easily articulated principle. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363
(9th Cir. 1986) (applying Washington State law and emphasizing the requirement
of benefit to the master); Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry & Neurol-
ogy, 329 N.W.2d 306 (Minn. 1983) (the court, skirting negligence and intent, found
motivation to serve irrelevant); Cosgrove v. Lawrence, 520 A.2d 844, 847-49 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986) (focusing on both the purpose of the action and
whether it was "substantially within authorized time and space limits"), affd, 522
A.2d 483 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987).
States have adopted different variations of the Restatement test. For example,
Alabama has a variation on the "scope of employment" test known as the "line
and scope" of employment test.
The test is the service in which the employee is engaged. The rule is
whether certain conduct of an employee is within the line and scope of
his employment....
The conduct of the employee ... must not be impelled by motives
that are wholly personal, or to gratify his own feelings or resentment,
but should be in promotion of his employment.
Solmica of the Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Braggs, 232 So. 2d 638, 642-43 (Ala. 1970) (cita-
tions and emphasis omitted); see also Doe v. Swift, 570 So. 2d 1209, 1211 (Ala.
1990). One court simply found that a psychiatrist's sexual relationship with his pa-
tient was "not within the scope of his employment" without conducting any further
inquiry. Sharples v. State, 793 P.2d 175, 177 (Haw. 1990) (citing Cosgrove, 520
A.2d at 844, without elaboration).
' The Restatement (Second) of Agency section 228 requires that the offending
conduct occur "substantially within authorized time and space limits." The New
Jersey court in Cosgrove found that sexual contact between a therapist and pa-
tient, which occurred outside the therapist's office, was not within authorized time
and space limits. 520 A.2d at 846-47. On a similar set of facts, the court in
Simmons found that as the therapist's negligent abuse of the transference phenom-
enon occurred in his office during scheduled therapy sessions, time and space
limitations were satisfied. 805 F.2d at 1370. See infra notes 42-45 and accompany-
ing text.
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is employed to perform"--to deny employer liability for a
therapist's sexual misconduct. Such reasoning formed the basis
of a New Jersey court's denial of respondeat superior liability
in Cosgrove v. Lawrence.' The appellate court held that as a
matter of law the sexual relations between a social worker
therapist and his patient were not the kind of conduct the
therapist had been employed to perform." The court consid-
ered that sexual relations between social workers and their
clients violated the Code of Ethics of the National Association
of Social Workers. Additionally, the defendant himself testified
that "sexual relations with his client constituted improper
conduct on his part, were 'never meant to be a part of therapy,'
could not be justified as part of therapy, and were not used 'as
a treatment technique in any way."'2 6 For these reasons, the
doctrine of respondeat superior did not apply and the
therapist's employers were found immune from vicarious liabil-
ity.3
7
The third element of the Restatement test-that the con-
duct be motivated to serve the employer-is often contested in
therapist sexual misconduct cases. Many courts view a health
care provider's sexual contact with a patient as solely for the
employee's gratification and therefore absolutely unrelated to
the employment. For example, in Andrews v. United States,8
a physician's assistant engaged in a sexual relationship with a
patient after assuring her of the therapeutic value of sexual
4 522 A.2d at 484-85.
3 Id. at 484.
r Id.
" Id. This reasoning was followed in Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d
1053, 1057 (Utah 1989) ("Although [the therapist's] misconduct took place during,
or in connection with, therapy sessions, it was not the general kind of activity a
therapist is hired to perform."). In Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 287 (Colo.
1988) (en banc), the Colorado Supreme Court rejected respondeat superior liability
for a priestitherapist's sexual relationship with his parishioner. The court applied
the Colorado "scope of employment" test, which provides that "[ain employee is
acting within the scope of his employment if he is engaged in work which has
been assigned to him by his employer or he is doing what is necessarily incidental
to the work which has been assigned to him or which is customary within the
business in which the employee is engaged." Id. (citation omitted). The court held,
"A priest's violation of his vow of celibacy is contrary to the instructions and doc-
trines of the Catholic church. When a priest has sexual intercourse with a parish-
ioner it is not a part of the priest's duties nor customary within the business of
the church." Id.
732 F.2d 366, 370 (4th Cir. 1984) (applying South Carolina law).
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intimacy during the patient's first psychological counseling
session."9 The court found that such conduct clearly furthered
the employee's self interest and as such did not constitute a
bona fide part of the therapy the therapist had been hired to
provide." Therefore, the court held that the employer was not
vicariously liable for the therapist's acts.4' The court found,
however, that the employer could be found liable under a theo-
ry of negligent supervision for the supervising therapist's fail-
ure while acting within the scope of his employment to proper-
ly supervise the abusing therapist.42
- Id. at 368.
40 Id. at 370 (Nothing in the record suggests that [the therapist] considered
his sexual adventures to be a bona fide part of the therapy he was employed to
provide. On the contrary, the government took the position at trial that [the ther-
apist] never had sexual relations with [the patient].").
41 Id.; see also Doe v. Swift, 570 So. 2d 1209, 1213 (Ala. 1990) (sexual assault
by psychologist during first therapy session with in-patient plaintiff not within line
and scope of psychologist's employment and therefore his employer was not liable;
one therapy appointment not enough time for "transference" to develop); Sharples
v. State, 793 P.2d 175, 177 (Haw. 1990); P.S. v. Psychiatric Coverage, Ltd., 887
S.W.2d 622, 625 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (sexual encounters between therapist and
patient in office, therapist's car and therapisfs apartment "resulted from purely
private and personal desires" and therefore not within therapist's scope of employ-
ment); Cosgrove v. Lawrence, 520 A.2d 844, 848 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986)
(holding that the defendant "had betrayed his trust as a therapist and that his
conduct was too little actuated by a purpose to serve his employer"), affd, 522
A.2d 483 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987); Bunce v. Parkside Lodge, 596 N.E.2d
1106, 1109 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (stating that sexual contact occurring in a coun-
seling program is completely unrelated to the business of the employer); Birkner v.
Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989).
[T]he admitted purpose of [the therapist] was not to further the
employer's interest, but only a personal interest, and his conduct was
strictly prohibited both by the employer's work rules and the rules gov-
erning his professional conduct.... [We hold that . . . the sexual con-
tacts were not within the scope of [the therapist's] employment.
Id. at 1058.
The court's decision in Psychiatric Coverage appears to contradict the decision
in Zipkin v. Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. 1968) (en bane), where the same court
found that a therapist's sexual misconduct constituted negligence and thus could
fall under the language defining professional services in a liability insurance poli-
cy. The Zipkin court examined a psychiatrist's mishandling of the transference
phenomenon and held that the clause in the professional insurance policy address-
ing "professional services rendered or which should have been rendered" covered
such a claim. Id. at 761. The Psychiatric Coverage court noted, however, that
Zipkin limited its holding to whether the claim was within the coverage of the
insurance policy.
' See infra text accompanying notes 187-97 for a discussion of negligent super-
vision.
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Some courts, however, have interpreted the Restatement
test to hold employers liable for sexual misconduct. For exam-
ple, the Ninth Circuit in Simmons v. United States,43 applied
the Restatement test to hold a social worker's employer liable
for the employee's sexual misconduct. The court found that the
social worker's sexual contact with his patient was motivated
in part by an intent to serve the employer and, therefore, fell
within the scope of the worker's employment. The court rea-
soned that because the sexual contact occurred "in conjunction
with legitimate counseling activities," the counselor had acted
within the scope of his employment.44
The Simmons court devoted substantial discussion to the
dynamics of the transference process. The court defined trans-
ference as a patient's projection of feelings, thoughts and wish-
es onto the therapist as a representative of a significant person
from the patient's past:45 Relying on a line of cases that found
abuse of the transference phenomenon inseparable from the
treatment itself, the Simmons court concluded that the abuse
of transference arose out of the ongoing therapy relationship.
The behavior thus fell within the scope of employment, war-
ranting the imposition of vicarious liability.46
Similarly, in Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Center,47 the
plaintiff sought damages from the counseling center for inju-
ries resulting from a sexual relationship with a counselor. The
center argued that the counselor's sexual relationship with the
plaintiff was motivated by his own self interest and, therefore,
it was not liable for the employee's actions.48 The court, reject-
ing this argument, reasoned that:
[Where tortious conduct arises out of and is reasonably incidental to
805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying Washington State law).
Id. at 1369.
4- Id. at 1364.
"' Id. at 1369-70; see also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Love, 459 N.W.2d
698, 702 (Minn. 1990) (finding therapist's sexual contact with patient was profes-
sional malpractice because "the transference phenomenon pervades the therapeutic
alliance [and] sexual conduct arising from the phenomenon may be viewed as the
consequence of a failure to provide proper treatment of the transference"); Zipkin,
436 S.W.2d at 763 (discussing mishandling of transference phenomenon as consti-
tuting "professional services rendered" and therefore within coverage of insurance
policy).
4' 791 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1990).
43 Id. at 346.
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the employee's legitimate work activities, the "motivation to serve"
test will have been satisfied. Given the transference phenomenon
that is alleged to have occurred in this case, we hold that it could
reasonably be concluded that the resulting sexual conduct was "inci-
dental" to the therapy'
The Samaritan Counseling Center court required the miscon-
duct to occur within authorized time and space limits, but did
not strictly confine those limits to specific session times or to
the center premises." Specifically, the court held that sexual
intercourse, occurring one month after termination of coun-
seling, could reasonably be found to fall within such prescribed
limits.5
At least one jurisdiction has modified the Restatement test
significantly by expressly abandoning the motivation to serve
the employer test.5" In eschewing this test, the court, in
Marston v. Minneapolis, reasoned that judicial attempts to
determine when an employee ceases to act in furtherance of
the employer's business and becomes motivated by personal
benefit are unrealistic and arbitrary.53
The court instead focused on the basis of the therapist's
Id. at 348. The court went on to state that
an employee is rarely authorized to commit a tort. We therefore construe
[the] provision [that an employee's act may not be "different in kind from
that authorized"] to mean only that the act which leads to the tortious
behavior cannot be different in kind from acts the employee is authorized
to perform in furtherance of the employer's enterprise.
Id. at n.7.
'0 Id. at 349.
1Id.
2 Minnesota explicitly abandoned the test in a case involving a cookie sales-
man who physically assaulted a grocery store owner over shelf space for his prod-
ucts. Lange v. National Biscuit Co., 211 N.W.2d 783, 786 (Minn. 1973). In finding
Nabisco liable for the actions of the representative, the court stated that "the
focus should be on the basis of the assault rather than the motivation of the em-
ployee." Id. at 785. The court viewed the entire episode as one indistinguishable
event based on the employee's performance of his duties. In so doing, the court
declined to undertake the difficult task of drawing a line between actions moti-
vated by an intent to serve and actions motivated by the representative's own
concerns. Id. The court then adopted the rule that "an employer is liable for an
assault by his employee when the source of the attack is related to the duties of
the employee" and the assault occurs within work-related time and space limits.
Id. at 786 (emphasis added).
329 N.W.2d 306, 308 (Minn. 1983). But see Bunce v. Parkside Lodge, 596
N.E.2d 1106, 1109 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (finding that such a point could be deter-
mined).
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sexual relations with his patient during therapy sessions. 4 It
did not consider the employee's motivation for the actual as-
sault a factor for the imposition of vicarious liability.5 Rath-
er, the court concluded that an employee's act falls within the
scope of employment when the act is foreseeable and bears a
relation to acts otherwise within the scope of employment. 6
The court concluded that the sexual contact between the psy-
chologist and his client related to the employee's duties. 7
Another variation of the motivation-to-serve test was artic-
ulated in Stropes v. Heritage House Children's Center.8 In
Stropes, an attendant at a home for disabled children sexually
assaulted a patient. 9 The court declined as a matter of law to
categorize sexual assaults as outside the scope of employment
even though such acts clearly were not sanctioned by the em-
ployer." Instead, it focused on whether the employee had
committed the sexual acts in the employment context. 1 Thus,
14 329 N.W.2d at 310-11.
" Id. at 311 (stating that "[one basic rationale underlying Lange is that it
would be a rare situation where a wrongful act would actually further an
employer's business").
" Id. The court noted that in the case of an intentional wrong the jury in-
struction might read:
An agent is acting within the scope of his employment when he is per-
forming services for which he has been employed or while he is doing
anything which is reasonably incidental to his employment. The conduct
must occur within work-related limits of time and place. The test is not
necessarily whether the specific conduct was expressly authorized or for-
bidden by the principal but rather whether such conduct should fairly
have been foreseen from the nature of the employment and the duties
relating to it.
Id. at 311 n.3. But see Doe v. Swift, 570 So. 2d 1209 (Ala. 1990) (stating that a
state psychologist's sexual contact with a patient was not undertaken to benefit
his employer and was not committed while in performance of his official duties or
within the scope of his employment); Cosgrove v. Lawrence, 520 A.2d 844, 847
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986) (refusing to follow Marston and stating that moti-
vation to serve is relevant and foreseeability is not significant in determining
whether an employee's act is within the scope of employment), affd, 522 A.2d 483
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987).
67 Marston, 329 N.W.2d at 311.
rs 547 N.E.2d 244 (Ind. 1989).
Id. at 245.
6o Id. at 249.
61 Id. at 250; see also Rodebush v. Oklahoma Nursing Homes, Ltd., 867 P.2d
1241 (Okla. 1993). In Rodebush, a nursing assistant slapped a patient while bath-
ing him. The court noted that an employee's act is within the scope of employ-
ment if it is "incident to some service being performed for the employer or arises
out of an emotional response to actions being taken for the employer." Id. at 1245.
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the court considered those legitimate job duties relative to the
patient,62 and concluded that a jury could find that the
attendant's actions were, "at least for a time, authorized by his
employer, related to the service for which he was employed,
and motivated to an extent by [his employer's] interests."63
In therapist-patient cases, the abuse of the transference
phenomena is often the element of the relationship that brings
the sexual misconduct within the employment context. The
trend is toward holding employers liable for acts that were
reasonably incidental to the employee's legitimate work activi-
ties. According to the Simmons court, for example, sexual con-
tact could reasonably be found incidental to therapy because
the sexual relationship resulted from the misuse of the
transference phenomenon." Similarly, the Marston court de-
termined that because of the transference phenomenon, dual
relationships between doctors and patients are well-recognized
risks in the therapy professions. The court reasoned that when
a risk is so well recognized, it is appropriate to hold an em-
ployer liable for the resulting harm. 5
3. Scope of Employment: Job-Created Authority
Another theory used to hold employers vicariously liable
for employees' wrongful actions is that the tort constituted an
abuse by the employee of his or her job-created authority. Un-
der this theory, employers may be found civilly liable for
employees' intentional torts and crimes. Employer liability
based on job-created authority is found most commonly in
cases involving police officers as their occupation has special
Because bathing of patients was a duty assigned to the nursing assistant, it met
these criteria. Id. at 1246.
' These duties included changing patients' clothing and bedding, and bathing
the patient. Stropes, 547 NS.2d at 245.
Id. at 250.
Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1365-66 (9th Cir. 1986).
6' Marston, 329 N.W.2d 306, 309 (Minn. 1983). Other cases have made a dis-
tinction between doctor-patient sexual contact and therapist-patient sexual contact
relative to scope of employment determinations. See, e.g., Odegard v. Finne, 500
N.W.2d 140 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (physician treating patient for physical condi-
tions cannot be held liable under Minnesota statute for sexual relationship with
that patient where physician did not perform psychotherapy on patient-the criti-
cal distinction being that transference is not a recognized component in the medi-
cal treatment of physical conditions).
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duties and powers associated with it such as the authority to
detain and arrest, and the considerable trust afforded by soci-
ety to law enforcement personnel.66 In Applewhite v. City of
Baton Rouge, 7 for example, the city was held liable when a
police officer, city employees and a state official stopped the
plaintiff, threatened her with arrest for vagrancy, ordered her
into the police car, and then raped her.6" The court reasoned
that the city should be liable for its employees' actions because
police officers, as public officials, are vested with considerable
public trust and authority.69
Attempts to analogize the theory of job-created authority
to other occupations where authority and trust are essential
elements of job performance have not met with much success.
The California Supreme Court rejected the application of the
theory to a case in which a teacher had sexually assaulted a
ninth-grade student. In John R. v. Oakland Unified School
District," the court ruled that the school district could not be
held vicariously liable for a teacher's sexual assault of a stu-
dent even when the student was under that teacher's exclusive
supervision.71 The court distinguished the actual authority
0 See, e.g., Turner v. State, 494 So. 2d 1292, 1296 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (holding
state liable for the actions of national guard recruiting officer who conducted phys-
ical "examinations" of female recruits and noting that "the sergeant's actions were
so closely connected to his employment duties that the risk of harm faced by the
young women was fairly attributable to his employer, who had placed the sergeant
in a position of trust and authority in contacting young persons for recruitment
into the guard").
380 So. 2d 119 (La. Ct. App. 1979).
6 Id. at 121-22.
Id.; see also White v. County of Orange, 212 Cal. Rptr. 493, 496 (Ct. App.
1985) The White court imposed liability on the county when a sheriff threatened to
rape and murder a motorist he had stopped. The court noted that a police officer
is entrusted with great authority and supplied with a police car, badge and gun,
which enable him to ensure prompt compliance with his directions. The White
court further stated,
The officer's method of dealing with this authority is certainly incidental
to his duties; indeed, it is an integral part of them .... [Tihe wrongful
acts flowed from the very exercise of this authority ... It follows that
the employer/government must be responsible for acts done during the
exercise of this authority.Id.
7 769 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1989).
" The school's instructional work-experience program allowed students to re-
ceive credit and monetary compensation for their work. Id. at 956. The students
could perform the required work at the teacher's home. The school did not require
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police officers have over citizens from the mere apparent au-
thority teachers have over students.72 While acknowledging
that important policy considerations might favor vicarious
liability,7 in this instance the court found that these consid-
erations were outweighed by the risk that liability would limit
educational goals by artificially formalizing student-teacher
interactions.74
In contrast, a recent Louisiana decision, Samuels v. South-
ern Baptist Hospital,"5 did apply the theory of job-created au-
thority to impose vicarious liability on the employer of a nurs-
ing assistant who had raped a patient in the psychiatric unit.
The court stated that "[elmployers are answerable for the dam-
age caused by their employees in the exercise of the functions
for which they are employed."" In reaching this conclusion,
the court reasoned that "[tlhe scope of risks attributable to an
employer increases with the amount of authority and freedom
of action granted to the servant in performing his assigned
tasks."77 Although the assistant had no actual authority to en-
gage in sexual acts with patients, his job duties necessarily put
him in a position of trust and physical contact with the pa-
tients. Because the assistant had abused these job-created du-
ties, the court imposed vicarious liability on the hospital."
written parental permission before a child participated in the program. Id.
72 Id. at 954-55.
" The court found that the following policy reasons supported a finding of
liability under theories of respondeat superior prevention of the acts; greater as-
surance of compensation for victims; and equitable distribution of costs among
parties. Id. at 955-56. The court concluded that while holding a city liable for acts
of the police officers furthers these policy reasons, holding a school district respon-
sible for the same acts by a teacher does not. Id.
74 Id. at 956-57.
"' 594 So. 2d 571 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 599 So. 2d 316 (La. 1992).
76 Id. at 573.
77 Id.
7' Id. at 574; see also Miller v. Stouffer, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 454, 458 (Ct. App.
1992) (stating that the factors to consider in determining the scope of employment
include the amount of freedom allowed the employee in performing the task).
The court in Lindheimer v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 643 So. 2d 636
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993), reviewed denied, No. 92-2254, 1995 Fla. LEXIS 112
(Fla. Jan. 18, 1995), while not specifically addressing job-created authority, found
that a dentist's sexual assault of a patient constituted an abuse of his position as
a dentist. Thus, the court held that the dentist's liability insurance covered his ac-
tions because he committed the sexual misconduct in the course of rendering pro-
fessional services. The court reasoned:
It is the patient's submission to treatment at the hands of the physician
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Other courts have used similar reasoning to hold employ-
ers liable when an employee abuses his or her authority. For
example, Erickson v. Christenson"9 involved a pastor who had
sexually abused one of his female parishioners in the course of
a counseling relationship. The court found that the harm to the
parishioner had resulted from the abuse of a confidential rela-
tionship unique to the counseling setting." The improper per-
formance of his pastoral counseling duties warranted the impo-
sition of liability on his employer.81
Similarly, in College Hospital v. Superior Court,2 the hos-
pital was held liable when its director of cardiopulmonary
services engaged in sexual relations with a psychiatric patient.
The court found that the employee had acted within the scope
of his employment stating that "a jury could find that [the
employee's] managerial position and his concomitant access to
information about [the patient's] condition and treatment tech-
niques put him in a unique position of influence over her, thus
justifying the imposition of liability on the hospital." 3 Such
reasoning provides one more example of the trend toward ex-
panding the definition of job-created authority to include non-
state sanctioned professions.
These cases, along with the cases involving the police, il-
lustrate the circumstances under which courts will hold em-
ployers liable for their employees' abuse of job-created authori-
ty and power. Generally, courts assume that employers should
be responsible for people in whom they vest power and author-
ity, especially when those people come in contact with third
parties.84 From a plaintiffs perspective, the trend in recent
which provides the opportunity for the misconduct that occurred, and in
the present case the administration of anesthesia . . . [-]a professional
service-immobilized the patient so that the doctor was able to take
advantage of her.
Id. at *7. Therefore, the patient's claim resulted from the rendition of professional
services that the malpractice policy covered. Id.
7' 781 P.2d 383 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
8 Id. at 385.
81 Id.
' 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 833 (Ct. App. 1993).
' Id. at 836.
" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1958) ("A master is not
subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the scope of their
employment, unless . . . the servant ... was aided in accomplishing the tort by
the existence of the agency relationship.").
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cases is encouraging: courts no longer exclusively focus on the
abuse of transference or analyze each separate act of the pro-
fessional to separate job-related from personal acts.85 Plain-
tiffs should urge courts to examine the entire episode of mis-
conduct to determine whether the professional abused the pow-
er, authority or trust vested in him or her.
Courts generally have been reluctant to extend the theory
of vicarious liability based on an employee's abuse of job-creat-
ed authority too far beyond the realm of police officers or oth-
ers with official power. This general reluctance, however, ap-
pears to be changing. The controversial nature of this theory
suggests that it may become a viable argument in unofficial
job-created authority cases. In the context of a therapist-pa-
tient relationship, courts tend to rely on the abuse of transfer-
ence as a basis for liability instead of relying on theories of
abuse of a job-created authority. The therapist-patient relation-
ship, however, may create apparent authority that affords a
therapist the opportunity to engage in acts in which he or she
could not otherwise engage.
4. Scope of Employment: Enterprise Liability
Enterprise liability theory offers yet another way to hold
the employer liable for an employee's tortious actions. This
theory seeks to balance the cost of reimbursing persons injured
by the acts of employees with the benefits derived by an em-
ployer from doing business. Thus, damages are viewed as part
of the employer's cost of doing business and as such are reflect-
ed in the price of the product or service. The loss-spreading
function of vicarious liability rests on the idea that business
expenses resulting from foreseeable acts or those relating to
the nature of the business should be borne by the business
enterprise and not by the injured party.86
See generally Linda Jorgenson et al., Therapist-Patient Sexual Exploitation
and Insurance Liability, 27 ToRT & INS. L.J. 595 (1992).
' The basis of respondeat superior has been stated as
the desire to include in the costs of operation inevitable losses to third
persons incident to carrying on an enterprise, and thus distribute the
burden among those benefitted by the enterprise.. . . Employees' acts
sufficiently connected with the enterprise are in effect considered as
deeds of the enterprise itself. Where through negligence such acts cause
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Enterprise liability theory focuses on whether an
employee's action is foreseeable given the nature of his or her
employment. 7 The employer must be responsible for those
actions which, in the course of business, cause injury to third
persons. An unforeseeable risk, however, does not allow an em-
ployer to weigh the costs of a business against its benefits to
determine whether it is worth pursuing. The outcome of enter-
prise liability cases primarily depends on factual determina-
tions as to whether an act is so related to the employment as
to be a foreseeable risk of the enterprise.' For example, it is
foreseeable that a delivery person might assault a customer or
that a salesperson could cause an automobile accident. 9 The
foreseeability of such risks and their close connection to the
nature of the business justifies requiring the employer to com-
pensate the victim for the costs of the employee's wrongful
conduct. Under this theory the employee does not have to be
motivated by an intent to serve the employer while performing
the act.
The D.C. Circuit used enterprise liability theory while
finding employer liability in Lyon v. Carey.9" In this case, a
injury to others it is appropriate that the enterprise bear the loss in-
curred.
Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr., 791 P.2d 344, 349 (Alaska 1990) (quoting Fruit
v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133, 140-41 (Alaska 1972)).
The American Law Institute conducted a study on enterprise liability and
devised a proposal that would create true "organizational liability" for a hospital.
The proposal suggested that doctors should not obtain personal malpractice liabili-
ty insurance but that the hospitals should assume the liability and the duty to
provide insurance. This would be more cost-effective and would allow patients to
sue hospitals instead of the individual doctor. AMERICAN LAW INST., 2 ENTERPRISE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 113-15 (1991).
8' See Samaritan Counseling Ctr., 791 P.2d at 348 (abuse of transference was
foreseeable from the nature of the professional relationship).
See, e.g., Doe v. Swift, 570 So. 2d 1209 (Ala. 1990) (insufficient time for
transference to develop, therefore psychiatrist's actions not within the scope of his
employment); DeStefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988) (holding that sexu-
al conduct by a priest engaged in marriage counseling did not necessitate imposi-
tion of vicarious liability on the archdiocese); Sharples v. State, 793 P.2d 175
(flaw. 1990) (psychiatrist's sexual relationship was, as a matter of law, not within
the scope of his employment); Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah
1989) (licensed social worker's sexual misconduct did not warrant imposition of
vicarious liability on the county).
' See Lyon v. Carey, 533 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Fruit v. Schreiner, 502
P.2d 133 (Alaska 1972).
DD 533 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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delivery man assaulted and raped a customer while at her
apartment to deliver a mattress. The court held the delivery
company liable for the assault and stated:
It is within the enterprise liability of vendors like furniture stores
and those who deliver for them that deliverymen, endeavoring to
serve their masters, are likely to be in situations of friction with
customers, and... these foreseeable altercations may precipitate
violence for which recovery may be had, even though the particular
type of violence was not in itself anticipated or foreseeable. 1
Pivotal to the court's decision was its finding that the assault
arose out of a dispute over employment-related matters and
not out of "propinquity and lust."92
The Alaska Supreme Court in Fruit v. Schreiner93 com-
bined the enterprise liability theory with a motivation-to-serve
analysis. In Fruit, a salesman attending a job-related conven-
tion injured a third party in a car accident. The accident oc-
curred on the salesman's ride back to his hotel after an eve-
ning of socializing with other salesmen. The court rejected the
defendant's theory that the employer was liable only for acts
that it expressly had authorized or ratified. The court noted
that "'[slcope of employment' as a test for application of re-
spondeat superior would be insufficient if it failed to encom-
pass the duty of every enterprise to the social community
which gives it life and contributes to its prosperity."94 Using
" Id. at 651.
Id. at 655. The court stated:
If ... the assault was not motivated or triggered off by anything in the
employment activity but was the result of only propinquity and lust,
there should be no liability. However, if the assault, sexual or otherwise,
was triggered off or motivated or occasioned by a dispute over the con-
duct-then and there-of the employer's business, then the employer
should be liable.
Id.
502 P.2d 133 (Alaska 1972).
" Id. at 140-41. In support of its reasoning, the court stated:
There was a time when the artisans, shopkeepers and master craftsmen
could directly oversee the activities of their apprentices and journeymen.
Small, isolated communities or feudal estates evinced a provincial sense
of social interaction which ensured that many enterprises would conduct
their businesses with a careful concern for the community of its patrons.
But in the present day when hundreds of persons divide labors under the
same corporate roof and produce a single product for market to an un-
identified consumer, the communal spirit and shared commitment of
enterprises from another age is sacrificed to other efficiencies. At the
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this reasoning, the court found that the salesman's socializing
with out-of-town salesmen benefitted his employer and held
the employer vicariously liable for the salesman's negligence.
Adhering to a similar rationale and quoting Fruit, the
Alaska Supreme Court again focused on the cost-spreading and
foreseeabiity aspects of enterprise liability in Doe v. Samari-
tan Counseling Center.95 With respect to the motivation-to-
serve requirement, the court found that, "where tortious con-
duct arises out of and is reasonably incidental to the
employee's legitimate work activities, the 'motivation to serve'
test will have been satisfied.""8 It reasoned that a narrower
reading of the motivation-to-serve test would "too significantly
undercut the enterprise liability basis of the respondeat supe-
rior doctrine" which it had articulated previously in Fruit.7
Although the court found that the employee's actions somehow
must be related or incidental to the employment, enterprise
theory of liability was the driving force behind imposition of
vicarious liability against the employer."
The theory of enterprise liability is not without its critics.
Some dispute the application of enterprise liability theory to
non-commercial enterprises such as public hospitals. Those
commentators argue that such liability could jeopardize these
organization's very existence.99 Furthermore, some fear that
same time, the impersonal nature of such complex enterprises and their
mechanization make third parties considerably more vulnerable to injury
incidentally arising from the pursuit of the business. Business corpora-
tions are granted a personal identification in legal fiction to limit liability
of the investors, but not to insulate the corporate entity itself from liabil-
ity for the unfortunate consequences of its enterprise.
Id. at 140.
791 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1990).
" Id. at 348.
, Id. at 349.
" Id. at 349 (stating that "[employees' acts sufficiently connected with the
enterprise are in effect considered as deeds of the enterprise itself' such that "it is
appropriate that the enterprise bear the loss incurred").
" See Cliona M. Robb, Bad Samaritans Make Dangerous Precedent: The Perils
of Holding an Employer Liable for an Employee's Sexual Misconduct, 8 ALASKA L.
REV. 181 (1991); see also William F. Baxter, Enterprise Liability, Public and Pri-
vate, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 51 (1978) (stressing dichotomy between com-
mercial and non-commercial applications of enterprise liability theory and stating
that the deterrence rationale for enterprise liability, which assumes that business-
es are better able than victims to reduce harms associated with the enterprise and
to bear costs associated with those harms, does not apply to public and non-profit
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the definition of foreseeable acts will be expanded to include
acts that are merely conceivable and further contend that
there is no guarantee that costs will be distributed appropri-
ately rather than simply passed along to innocent consum-
ers.
100
Yet enterprise liability is appropriate at least in situations
of sexual misconduct by therapists. Just as altercations be-
tween deliverypersons and customers are foreseeable risks of
the delivery business, sexual contact is a foreseeable risk of
therapeutic relationships.' The American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation expressly warns practitioners that "the necessary inten-
sity of the therapeutic relationship may tend to activate sexual
and other needs and fantasies on the part of both patient and
therapist, while weakening the objectivity necessary for con-
trol."10 2 This warning, far from a casual statement, attests to
the serious risk of sexual contact in the therapeutic relation-
ship.10 3
B. Apparent Agency and Agency by Estoppel
Agency by estoppel provides another theory by which em-
ployers may be held liable for sexual misconduct by therapists.
Theories of apparent or ostensible agency and agency by estop-
pel impose liability on an employer for the negligent acts of
someone who is not technically an employee. Thus, liability
does not result from an actual employment arrangement, but
from a misleading act or omission by the employer, whether
intentional or not, that causes a third party to believe that
such a relationship exists.
The doctrines of apparent or ostensible agency and agency
entities who cannot pass along costs to clients).
,0' Robb, supra note 99, at 192; see also Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr., 791
P.2d 344, 352 (Alaska 1990) (dissenting opinion).
"'1 See generally SCHOENER ET AL., supra note 3 (stating that sexual contact is
a recognized risk in the therapeutic relationship).
102 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS WITH
ANNOTATIONS ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE TO PSYCHIATRY § 2.1 (1985).
113 METRO ACTION COMM. ON PUBLIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND CHILDREN
("METRAC"), BREACH OF TRUST IN SEXUAL ASSAULT: STATE OF THE PROBLEM PART
I 7 (1992). Studies reveal that as many as 12% of therapists self-report that they
have had sexual contact with one or more of their patients during the therapeutic
relationship or within a short time of its termination.
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by estoppel derive primarily from two Restatement provisions.
Section 429 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states:
One who employs an independent contractor to perform services for
another which are accepted in the reasonable belief that the services
are being rendered by the employer or his servants, is subject to
liability for physical harm caused by the negligence of the contractor
in supplying such services, to the same extent as though the employ-
er were supplying them himself or by his servants."M
Section 267 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency states:
One who represents that another is his servant or other agent and
thereby causes a third person justifiably to rely upon the care or
skill of such apparent agent is subject to liability to the third person
for harm caused by the lack of care or skill of the one appearing to
be a servant or other agent as if he were such.'
The elements of apparent or ostensible agency include a rea-
sonable belief in the agent's authority, generated by some act
or omission of the principal sought to be held liable, and a lack
of negligence on the part of the person relying on the agent's
apparent authority.
106
In the context of hospitals and other health care institu-
tions' liability for physicians' misconduct, courts consider two
factors: a holding out by the institution that the physician is
an employee, and a reasonable belief on the part of the patient
that the physician is an employee. As a threshold matter
courts often inquire into whether the patient looked to the
institution for care rather than to the individual physician."°7
Many patients rely on the reputation of a hospital or a health
care institution when choosing treatment locations. Such reli-
ance often provides a ground for imposing liability on the
health care provider for the independent physician's acts."s
"0 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429 (1965).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1958).
... Hill v. Citizens Nat'l Trust & Say. Bank, 69 P.2d 853, 855 (Cal. 1937); see
also Grewe v. Mt. Clemens Gen' Hosp., 273 N.W.2d 429, 434 (Mich. 1978).
" See Paintsville Hosp. v. Rose, 683 S.W.2d 255 (Ky. 1985); McClellan v.
HMO, 604 A.2d 1053, 1057 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med.
Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229, 1234 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
'" See, e.g., Uhr v. Lutheran Gen'l Hosp., 589 N.E.2d 723, 733 (Il. App. Ct.
1992) (stating that "unless there is some reason for a patient to believe that the
treating physician in a hospital is an independent contractor, it is natural for the
patient to assume reliance on the reputation of the hospital as opposed to any
specific doctor"); Grewe, 273 N.W.2d at 433 (stating that the critical question is
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The existence of an independent patient-physician rela-
tionship does not bar finding ostensible agency on the part of
the treating hospital. This was demonstrated in Thompson v.
Nason Hospital,"9 where the patient's private physician had
admitted the plaintiff to the hospital through its emergency
room. The court held that an independent physician-patient
relationship did not, as a matter of law, preclude a reasonable
belief on the part of the patient that the physician had ren-
dered care as an agent of the hospital."' Even a disclaimer
by the hospital may not shield it from liability.
For instance, Beeck v. Tucson General Hospital,"' in-
volved a patient who had signed a treatment authorization
form upon admission which stated that the x-ray department
physicians were independent contractors unaffiliated with the
hospital."' The court found that the signed disclaimer did
not preclude a finding of ostensible agency. The court held the
hospital liable for the patient's severe injuries, suffered when a
screen from the x-ray machine struck a needle inserted in her
back by the radiologist. Unless the hospital could prove that
the radiologist had acted as an independent contractor, the
clause did not bar the plaintiffs recovery from the hospital."'
"whether the plaintiff, at the time of his admission to the hospital, was looking to
the hospital for treatment . . .or merely viewed the hospital as the situs where
his physician would treat him"); White v. Methodist Hosp., 844 S.W.2d 642 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1992).
... 535 A.2d 1177 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988), affd, 591 A.2d 703 (Pa. 1991).
O The court noted that the hospital "held out" the doctor as their agent
through the privileges they gave him and by the manner in which he worked at
the hospital. The doctor held staff privileges with the hospital, he treated the
plaintiff in the emergency room and arranged for her admission to the intensive
care unit and he arranged for diagnostic tests and consultations with at least
three different doctors. Id. at 1179-80; see also Strach v. St. John Hosp. Corp., 408
N.W.2d 441, 446 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (expressing "disapproval of the often-sug-
gested proposition that an independent relationship between the patient and his
treating physician requires a finding of no agency relationship as a matter of
law").
l 500 P.2d 1153 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972).
'" See Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hosp., 397 P.2d 161 (Cal. 1964) (hospital liable
for actions of group of anesthesiologists under independent contractor agreement);
White v. Methodist Hosp., 844 S.W.2d 642 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (where anesthesi-
ologist is independent contractor of hospital and patient is precluded from choosing
own anesthesiologist, hospital is liable for acts of independent contractor).
n3 Beeck, 500 P.2d at 1159; see also Mduba v. Benedictine Hosp., 52 A.D.2d
450, 452, 384 N.Y.S.2d 527, 529 (3d Dep't 1976) (holding that provisions in con-
tracts were "not determinative of the relation in the event that the actualities
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Referrals by staff physicians to non-staff physicians also
may establish an agency relationship. In Howard v. Park,"'
the owner of a medical clinic faced liability for the negligence
of a physician working as an independent contractor at the
clinic. After examining the patient, the clinic owner referred
her to the independent contractor. Because the treatment took
place entirely in the clinic, and the clinic billed the patient, the
referral established sufficient reason for the patient to assume
that the independent contractor worked for the clinic." 5
Defendant hospitals often argue that it is the patient's
responsibility to determine whether a doctor is an employee of
the hospital before accepting treatment. Yet courts have held
that patients have no duty to inquire about the employment
status of an individual physician, especially when the hospital
either furnishes the caregiver or refers the patient to the
caregiver. In Capan v. Divine Providence Hospital,"6 for ex-
ample, the treatment in question occurred in the hospital's
emergency room. The court stated that "[ilt would be absurd to
require such a patient to be familiar with the law of responde-
at superior and so to inquire of each person who treated him
whether he is an employee of the hospital or an independent
contractor.""' Similarly, the court in Quintal v. Laurel Grove
Hospital... held that the patient need not inquire as to the
employment status of the anesthesiologists aiding his sur-
geon.1
19
Most courts make a finding of ostensible agency based on
indicate otherwise").
14 195 N.W.2d 39 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972).
1 Id. at 41-42.
... 430 A.2d 647 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).
. Id. at 649; see also Adamski v. Tacoma Gen'I Hosp., 579 P.2d 970 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1978) (material issue of fact existed as to whether emergency-room physi-
cian who treated the patient was hospital's agent); Seneris v. Haas, 291 P.2d 915,
927 (Cal. 1955) ("There is nothing in the record to show that plaintiffs should
have been on notice that defendant . . .was not an employee of defendant hospi-
tal and it cannot be 'seriously contended' that she was obliged to inquire whether
each person who attended her in said hospital was an employee or an independent
contractor."); Stanhope v. Los Angeles College of Chiropractic, 128 P.2d 705, 708
(Cal. Ct. App. 1942) (stating that it cannot be "seriously contended" that the plain-
tiff should have inquired as to the employment status of the x-ray technician
when he was being carried from room to room in excruciating pain).
n" 397 P.2d 161 (Cal. 1964).
" Id. at 169.
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more than one act or omission by a hospital. 2 ' Additional cir-
cumstances that, in combination, may support such a finding
include whether the treatment took place entirely on the
hospital's premises; ... the hospital billed the patient for the
independent physician's services;"2 and the physician main-
tained an office or held a title at the hospital."2
The agency by estoppel theory allows a patient who can
prove a detrimental reliance on the hospital's representation
that an independent physician is its employee to estop the
hospital from raising lack of agency as a defense to vicarious
liability for the physician's conduct. 24 Although difficult to
establish, the burden of detrimental reliance is not impossible
to meet. Courts have examined the reasonable beliefs and
expectations of the public to determine whether the plaintiff
detrimentally relied on hospital representations or omis-
12 See, e.g., Brown v. Moore, 247 F.2d 711 (3d Cir. 1957) (it is for the jury to
decide whether the parties who owned a sanitarium were liable for the malprac-
tice of the director), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 882 (1957); Whitaker v. Zirkle, 374
S.E.2d 106 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (although the doctor was an independent contrac-
tor, general issues of material fact as to the doctor's apparent authority for hospi-
tal precluded summary judgment); Howard v. Park, 195 N.W.2d 39 (Mich. Ct. App.
1972); Mduba v. Benedictine Hosp., 52 A.D.2d 450, 384 N.Y.S.2d 527 (3d Dep't
1976) (holding hospital liable for emergency-room physician's negligence, whether
or not he was an independent contractor).
1 See Howard, 195 N.W.2d at 40.
122 It is a reasonable assumption that the caregiver is an employee of the hospi-
tal when the bill for the services comes from the hospital and is printed on their
letterhead. See, e.g., Howard, 195 N.W.2d at 41 (bill was sent on clinic's letterhead
and had the doctor's name on it); see also Kober v. Stewart, 417 P.2d 476 (Mont.
1966) (hospital furnished space and employees for the x-ray department and
charged for its services).
' See, e.g., Street v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 558 A.2d 690, 692 (D.C. 1989)
(stating that it is logical assumption that a doctor is an employee of the hospital
when the hospital furnishes him with an office); Whitaker, 374 SE.2d at 109 (fact
that doctor's written report was issued on hospital stationery showing the doctor
to be the director of the hospital's department of pathology held controlling factor
in creating jury question whether doctor was agent of hospital).
"' See Capan v. Divine Providence Hosp., 430 A.2d 647, 650 (Pa. Sup. Ct.
1980) (detrimental reliance was established where patient allows doctor to treat
her based on patient's knowledge of hospital's reputation and assumption that
doctor works for the hospital).
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sions.'" The court in Jackson v. Power,126 for example,
found that direct testimony is not needed to show that the pa-
tient detrimentally relied on the representations of the hospital
unless the plaintiff knew or should have known the true na-
ture of the employment relationship.12 The patient therefore
needs to show only that no prior relationship existed between
the treating physician and the plaintiff, and that the patient
possessed no knowledge of the employment status of the doc-
tor. While detrimental reliance is clearly a stricter test than
mere reasonable belief, it is not an impossible test to pass.
C. Common Carrier Liability
The theory of common carrier liability, which emerged
from railroads passengers cases, provides another means of
establishing employer liability for sexual misconduct. The
railroad passenger cases based liability on the exclusive control
the defendant had over the plaintiff.12 1 Once inside the rail-
road car the passenger surrenders the right to control his or
her environment and is unable to change variables such as the
" See, e.g., Mduba v. Benedictine Hosp., 52 A.D.2d 450, 453, 384 N.Y.S.2d 527,
529 (3d Dep't 1976) ("Patients entering the hospital through the Emergency Room,
could properly assume that the treating doctors and staff of the hospital were
acting on behalf of the hospital. [They] are not bound by secret limitations as are
contained in a private contract between the hospital and the doctor.").
'2 743 P.2d 1376 (Alaska 1987).
" Id. at 1382 n.10 ("[The] application of apparent authority in the hospi-
tal/emergency room physician situation does not require . . . direct testimony as to
reliance . . . absent evidence that the patient knew or should have known that
the treating physician was not a hospital employee when the treatment was ren-
dered").
" The common carrier theory of liability and the non-delegable duty theory
often overlap. See infra notes 152-57, 205-30 and accompanying text. Common-
carrier liability imposes a very high duty of care on the employer. This duty is
owed directly to the passenger, and is not delegable. Therefore, while the employer
may employ others to carry out the duty (for example, security personnel), the
employer never relinquishes responsibility for the failure to properly carry out that
duty. Common carrier liability theory is characterized as an exception to the re-
spondeat superior doctrine because it imposes liability on the employer for any
action that breaches the duty owed by the employer to the passengers taken by
its employees, whether in the scope of their employment or not, or even by non-
employees. See, e.g., Morton v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 984 F.2d 289, 292 (9th Cir.
1993) (stating that relationship between cruise line and passenger was such that it
imposed a duty of protection on the master that it could not delegate), cert. de-
nied, 114 S. Ct. 289 (1993).
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route travelled or the safety of the train. The party who con-
trols the environment and profits from such control must bear
the risk of loss from any harm that results from the
passenger's choice to travel on that train.'" The common car-
rier theory's application has evolved to include inns and ho-
tels.2 ° Common carrier theory thus calls for an extraordi-
nary, non-delegable duty of care that imposes liability on the
employer for any harm befalling the plaintiff. The plaintiff is
not obligated to prove that the employee was acting under the
scope of his or her employment or even that the actor was the
defendant's employee.3 '
An employer has a duty to protect a client and cannot
delegate liability for a breach of that duty to anyone else.'32
Courts sometimes couch the common carrier theory of liability
in the language of implied contract. This rationale creates an
obligation based upon the parties' intent or understanding of
the circumstances or the relationship rather than upon an
express oral or written agreement. For example, Vannah v.
Hart Private Hospital,13 3 involved a hospital's liability for a
nurse's theft of a valuable ring from a sedated patient in the
operating room. The court mentioned that the common carrier
liability stems from the implied contract between the carrier
and the passenger and by analogy held the hospital account-
"' Stropes ex rel. Taylor v. Heritage House Children's Ctr., 547 N.E.2d 244
(Ind. 1989).
[Common carriers, inn-keepers, merchants, managers of theaters, and
others, who invite the public to become their patrons and guests, and
thus submit personal safety and comfort to their keeping, owe a more
special duty to those who may accept such invitation. Such patrons and
guests have a right to ask that they shall be protected from injury while
present on such invitation and particularly that they shall not suffer
wrong from the agents and servants of those who have invited them.
Id. at 252 (quoting Dickson v. Waldron, 34 N.E. 506, 510 (Ind. 1893)).
12' See, e.g., Dye v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Supermarkets, Inc., 627 So. 2d
688 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (discussing application of common carrier theory of liabili-
ty to other entities, including hotel's liability to its guests), writ denied, 634 S.2d
401 (La. 1994).
12' Both the respondeat superior and common carrier theories base liability on
the concept of control. In respondeat superior, the focus is on the employer's au-
thority to control its employee's activities. The common carrier theory shifts the
focus to the plaintiffs surrender of the ability to control her environment to the
employer. See Stropes, 547 N.E.2d at 252-53.
"2 The non-delegable duty is discussed further at infra notes 205-30 and accom-
panying text.
1 117 N.E. 328 (Mass. 1917).
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able in contract for the loss because "an act of the defendant's
servants which while not in the course of the servants' employ-
ment is none the less a violation of the duty owed by the de-
fendant under the defendant's contract with the plaintiff.""
The court reasoned that the hospital absolutely guaranteed
protection to the patient at a time when she was unable to
protect herself.135
Courts have moved away from finding an implied contract
to ensure the safety of clients and patients. In G.L. v. Kaiser
Foundation Hospital,'36 a patient was drugged and sexually
assaulted by a respiratory therapist employed by the hospital.
In the absence of negligence on the part of the hospital or an
express contract for the safekeeping of patients, the court did
not find the hospital liable.'37 While the court recognized that
hospitals take on a special responsibility by admitting patients
and providing care, it reasoned that such acts do not make
hospitals absolutely responsible for patients' safety. 38
In recent cases, the existence of a special relationship
warranting a higher duty of care, rather than an implied con-
tractual relationship, has been more effective in convincing
courts to impose liability on employers. For example, in
Eversole v. Wasson,'39 a teacher assaulted a student on school
grounds who the teacher believed had smashed a Halloween
pumpkin at the teacher's home. The court held that while an
intentional tort committed outside the scope of employment
ordinarily would not implicate the employer,' under the
particular circumstances the school district could be held lia-
", Id. at 330. The court did not specify whether this contract was express or
implied.
"' The Vannah court noted that the legal aspects of the case were governed by
the decision in Bryant v. Rich, 106 Mass. 180 (1870), where a passenger on a
steamer and a steamer employee got into a fight. That court held that, as a mat-
ter of contract, the passenger had the right to receive proper treatment from the
defendant and its servants. Vannah, 117 N.E. at 330. The Vannah court stated
that the implied contract doctrine does not depend on a passenger-carrier relation-
ship, but applies "whenever there is a contract between the plaintiff and defendant
by force of which the defendant is to furnish for the plaintiffs comfort the service
of its, the defendant's, employees." Id.
'2' 757 P.2d 1347 (Or. 1988).
137 Id.
us Id. at 1354.
"9 398 N.E.2d 1246 (Ill. Ct. App. 1980).
'40 Id. at 1247-48.
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ble."' The court reasoned that a special relationship existed
between the student and the school district requiring the dis-
trict to protect the student.14 This relationship was created
by the statutory requirement that the student attend
school. 4 1
In other cases that address special relationships requiring
a higher duty of care, courts have noted that such relation-
ships exist between hospitals and patients, thus invoking the
common carrier standard of care.' In the context of health
care provider sexual misconduct, the court in Stropes v. Heri-
tage House Children's Center relied on the common carrier
theory of liability.'45 In Stropes, a caregiver at a residential
facility sexually assaulted a patient. The court predicated lia-
141 Id. at 1248.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 See, e.g., Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apt. Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
Other relationships in which [duties to protect] have been imposed in-
clude . . . school district-pupil, hospital-patient and carrier-passenger. In
all, the theory of liability is essentially the same: that since the ability of
one of the parties to provide for his own protection has been limited in
some way by his submission to the control of the other, a duty should be
imposed upon the one possessing control (and thus the power to act) to
take reasonable precautions to protect the other one from assaults by
third parties which, at least, could reasonably have been anticipated.
However, there is no liability normally imposed upon the one having the
power to act if the violence is sudden and unexpected provided that the
source of the violence is not an employee of the one in control.
Id. at 482-83 (emphasis added); see also Sebastian v. District of Columbia, 636
A.2d 958 (D.C. 1994) (broadened liability based on special relationships has usually
been limited to common carriers, innkeepers and hospitals); Nazareth v. Herndon
Ambulance Serv., 467 So. 2d 1076, 1079 (Fla. 1985) (stating that the basis for tort
liability and a special duty to protect has been applied in situations involving
hospitals). As the court in Dye v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Supermarkets, Inc.,
627 So. 2d 688 (La. Ct. App. 1993) noted, courts have recognized a duty to pro-
tect, even from unnamed and unknowable third persons, by
those businesses which have a unique relationship to customers-hotels
to their guests, hospitals to their patients, common carriers to their cus-
tomers. In these situations the guests, patients, and customers have
placed their safety in the hands of hotels, hospitals, and common carriers
who in turn have assumed the responsibility for their welfare.
Id. at 692 (emphases added); see also Doe v. Linder Constr. Co., 845 S.W.2d 173,
191 (Tenn. 1992) (stating that the duty to protect arises from special relationships,
including those that exist between a hospital and patient); KEETON, supra note 21,
§ 70, at 465 (discussing the broader liability imposed on common carriers, innkeep-
ers and hospitals).
141 547 N.E.2d 244 (Ind. 1989).
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bility on "the passenger's surrender and the carrier's assump-
tion of the responsibility for the passenger's safety, the ability
to control his environment, and his personal autonomy in
terms of protecting himself from harm."146 It considered the
carrier a bailor or an insurer and analogized the passengers to
goods bailed or insured. 4 Thus, the employer was respon-
sible for an employee's act that had breached the carrier's non-
delegable duty to protect the passenger, regardless of whether
the act was within the scope of the employment. 4 ' The
Stropes court focused on the relationship between the patient
and the caregiver and the degree of control and autonomy sur-
rendered by the patient due to that relationship. The court
noted that common carrier liability is premised on the surren-
der of the passenger's safety and protection to the enterprise,
and observed that the exception had been applied to enterpris-
es other than common carriers.'49 In finding the facility lia-
ble, the court noted that the employee's scope of employment is
not the relevant determinant.
The court in Nazareth v. Herndon Ambulance Service held
likewise."O In Nazareth, an ambulance company employee
had sexually assaulted a woman whom he was transporting to
a hospital. The court found that an implied contract for safe
passage existed between the ambulance company and the pas-
senger, and that the ambulance functioned as a common carri-
er for liability purposes."' "Once the undertaking to
transport a passenger has begun, this extraordinary duty [of
4' Id. at 253.
147 Id.
" Id.; cf. G.L. v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 757 P.2d 1347, 1351 (1988) (stating
courts that have found an analogy between bailees and innkeepers "deal with the
care of bailed personal property, not persons, who, unlike property, are not
'bailed'"); see also Lyons v. Kamhoot, 575 P.2d 1389 (Or. 1978) (hotel guest/owner
of electric organ had no right to its possession on the day of alleged conversion of
organ where hotel improperly asserted an innkeeper's lien); Real Good Food Store
v. First Nat'l Bank, 557 P.2d 654 (Or. 1976) (once bank admitted receipt of funds
in the depository, it was not permitted to invoke exculpatory clause in a contract
to relieve itself of liability for the negligence of its employees).
19 547 NE.2d at 252. The court noted that in Dickson v. Waldron, 34 N.E. 506
(Ind. 1893), the common-carrier theory had been applied to a theater, analogizing
the theater's responsibility toward the patron to that of a common carrier toward
its passenger and holding that the treatment due was similar in kind. Id.
100 467 So. 2d 1076 (Fla. App. Dist. Ct. 1985).
l' Id. at 1081.
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common carrier] to the passenger [to protect from attack from
carrier's employees] arises, and does not terminate until the
journey is complete." '152 Because the court had determined
that the ambulance was a common carrier, it did not reach the
question of whether the duty would be the same for a non-
common carrier.153 The court did add, however, that "the
technical classification appears to us less significant than the
nature and scope of [the enterprise's] undertaking on behalf of
its users."54
Court decisions regarding the parameters of common carri-
er liability are not uniform. In Sebastian v. District of Colum-
bia,'55 for example, under nearly the same facts as Nazareth,
the court did not hold an ambulance company strictly liable for
its employee's intentional tort. The court rejected the common-
carrier theory and refused to impose a non-delegable duty of
care on the ambulance company. Instead the court referred
this issue to the state legislature.'56 Similarly, in Worcester
Insurance Co. v. Fells Acres Day School, Inc., 1 the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts declined to hold a daycare
center to the high standard of care imposed upon common
carriers. Though the state had adopted and applied common
carrier liability in other contexts, it was unwilling to include
daycare centers, reasoning that it would overextend existing
state law.'
Other courts have mentioned the duty owed by hospitals
in dicta. Such courts have expressed their belief that hospitals
have a non-delegable duty to protect patients from acts of third
parties simply because the hospital has accepted them as pa-
tients and is in the best position to protect them.'59 The court
in Samuels v. Southern Baptist Hospital,6 ° noted that
112 Id. at 1079.
3 Id. at 1081.
1 1 Id.
1'6 636 A.2d 958 (D.C. 1994).
... Id. at 962.
'6' 558 NE.2d 958 (Mass. 1990).
' Id. at 968.
... See, e.g., Insinga v. LaBella, 543 So. 2d 209, 214 (Fla. 1989) (stating that as
a matter of public policy, hospitals are in a superior position to supervise and
monitor a doctor's performance and are "the only entity that can realistically pro-
vide quality control).
"'O 594 So. 2d 571 (La. Ct. App.).
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"[e]nsuring a patient's well-being from others, including
staff... is part of the hospital's normal business."161 Similar-
ly, in Dye v. Schwegmann Brothers Giant Supermarkets,
the court described that a duty to protect clients from unartic-
ulated criminal conduct by unnamed and unknowable third
persons might arise in certain circumstances in
those businesses which have a unique relationship to custom-
ers--hotels to their guests, hospitals to their patients, common carri-
ers to their customers... guests, patients, and customers have
placed their safety in the hands of hotels, hospitals, and common
carriers who in turn have assumed the responsibility for their wel-
fare."'63
Although these statements are dicta, they should not be disre-
garded.' These theories ultimately may become a significant
part of the law imposing vicarious liability on patients.
Employer liability in therapist-patient sexual abuse cases
often stems from the imposition of vicarious liability for the
acts of their employees.'65 The respondeat superior doctrine
holds employers vicariously liable for acts their employees
perform within the scope of employment or that are motivated
by an intention to serve the employer. The competing and
often contradictory analyses of the respondeat superior doc-
trine with its modifications and exceptions demonstrate the
unsettled nature of this doctrine. Plaintiffs seeking to impose
vicarious liability on an employer for the sexual misconduct of
161 Id. at 574.
162 627 So. 2d 688 (La. Ct. App. 1993).
Id. at 692 (imposing a strict non-delegable duty of care on hospitals, akin to
that of a common carrier).
16 Such remarks have the potential for persuasive effect because they represent
opinions of courts that may well constitute a correct principle of law, but which
were simply unnecessary or incidental to the resolution of the matters pending.
See Bell v. Sharp Cabrillo Hosp., 260 Cal. Rptr. 886, 893 n.13 (Ct. App. 1989)
(hospital's breach of its duty to exercise reasonable care in selecting its employ-
ees).
" The teacher-student relationship is similar to that between a therapist and
patient. Both teachers and therapists may exercise their authority over vulnerable
people in their care to manipulate and control them. The very nature of their
profession requires therapists to probe into and learn the intimate details of
patients' lives. Patients submit to therapists' questions and conduct because they
believe that therapists are authorized to act in such a manner and do so because
it is in the patient's best interest. Students often respond in a similar manner to
their teachers and as such both therapists and teachers occupy positions of power
and authority that are easily abused.
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an employee may find that they can exercise a degree of cre-
ativity often precluded in other, more rigid areas of the law.
An employer may also be found liable even where the
employee's act was not within the scope of employment and
was not meant to further the employer's interests. The com-
mon carrier exception to the respondeat superior doctrine holds
an employer strictly liable for the acts of an employee that
breach the employer's non-delegable duty to the patient. While
the common carrier theory of liability arose out of the railroad
context, courts have occasionally extended it to other entities,
such as ambulances, that bear similar features to those of
common carriers and innkeepers. While common carrier is a
potential theory of recovery, plaintiffs should argue it in con-
junction with other, time-tested theories and should consider
theories of direct liability as well.
II. EMPLOYERS' DIRECT LIABILITY
An employer is found to be directly liable to third parties
injured by the actions of its employees if a plaintiff proves that
there is a direct link between the negligence by the employer
and the injury. Links are found when an employer is negligent
in such areas as the hiring, supervision or retention of employ-
ees. '6 To prevail, plaintiffs must show that the employer
owed them a duty, that the employer breached that duty, and
that this breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs inju-
ry. 1
67
A. Institutional Negligence
Courts may impose a duty on an institution to act in a
non-negligent manner toward its clients. 6 ' This duty was
"' Negligent hiring, supervising, and retention are separate causes of action
and do not involve vicarious liability. The principles involved in negligent hiring,
supervising, and retention are based on the law of torts, not the rule of agency,
and are therefore distinguishable from the agency doctrine of vicarious liability.
These negligence theories do not involve the scope of employment limitation. See
Tenantry v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 324 n.16 (Colo. 1993).
', See, e.g., Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166, 168 (Wash. 1984) (action against
hospital for alleged negligence toward decedent).
' Buckley v. Lovallo, 481 A.2d 1286 (Conn. App. Ct. 1984) (malpractice action
against physician and hospital).
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first applied to hospitals in 1965, in Darling v. Charleston
Community Memorial Hospital.'69 The court imposed a duty
of care on the hospital and established its overall obligation to
supervise the quality of patient care services. In that case, a
physician at the hospital had set the plaintiffs broken leg im-
properly eventually requiring its amputation. The court found
that the hospital owed a duty of care to the plaintiff that in-
cluded monitoring the work of its physicians."70
Public policy considerations also support the imposition of
liability on hospitals and health care institutions. A hospital is
clearly in a better position than a patient to perform such
tasks as supervising staff, enforcing regulations and rectifying
unsafe or unhealthy conditions. In addition, the potential for
liability creates a financial incentive for hospitals to implement
policies to ensure the safety of its patients and the competence
of the house staff and other employees.'
Negligent hiring is one way in which institutional employ-
ers, including hospitals, are liable for the acts of their employ-
ees. Liability is imposed if the employer knew, had reason to
believe, or failed to use reasonable care to discover that the
employee was unfit prior to hiring the employee. 7  This re-
9 211 N.E.2d 253 (I1. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
17' See id. at 257.
The conception that the hospital does not undertake to treat the patient,
does not undertake to act through its doctors and nurses, but undertakes
instead simply to procure them to act upon their own responsibility, no
longer reflects the fact. Present-day hospitals, as their manner of opera-
tion plainly demonstrates, do far more than furnish facilities for treat-
ment. They regularly employ on a salary basis a large staff of physicians,
nurses and interns, as well as administrative and manual workers, and
they charge patients for medical care and treatment, collecting for such
services, if necessary, by legal action. Certainly, the person who avails
himself of 'hospital facilities' expects that the hospital will attempt to
cure him, not that its nurses or other employees will act on their own
responsibility.
Id.
171 See, e.g., Bell v. Sharp Cabrillo Hosp., 260 Cal. Rptr. 886, 897 (Ct. App.
1989) (discussing the effect of pecuniary damages and economic pressures of the
market which will cause hospitals to ensure safety to remain competitive); Pedroza
v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166, 170 (Wash. 1984) (stating that a financial incentive exists
because "[t]he most effective way to cut liability insurance costs is to avoid corpo-
rate negligence").
2 It also is important te note that some courts have held employers to the
same standard of care for the work performed by volunteers. In Doe v. Boys
Clubs, 868 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994), the court held that a volunteer could
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quirement constitutes an independent duty imposed on the
institution to select competent staff17 and independent con-
tractors. 4
Because the duty is to select competent employees, em-
ployers may be liable if they are negligent in properly screen-
ing potential employees.7 5 For example, in Evan F. v.
Hughson United Methodist Church,76 the court held that a
church could be found liable for hiring a pastor who had been
discharged from a previous position for sexual misconduct in-
volving a minor parishioner where the pastor sexually abused
parishioners in his new position. The court found that a dili-
gent inquiry would have uncovered information alerting the
church to the pastor's prior sexual misconduct. Because it did
not perform such an inquiry before retaining the pastor, the
church faced liability for negligent hiring.'
be considered an employee for purposes of determining the liability of the club.
The court noted that the criteria used to determine whether a volunteer would be
so considered are "whether the employer: 1. Has a right to direct the duties of the
volunteer; 2. Has an interest in the work to be accomplished; 3. Accepts direct or
incidental benefit derived from the volunteer's work; and 4. Has a right to fire or
replace the volunteer." Id. at 950 (citation omitted); but see Harris County v.
Dillard, 883 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. 1994) (holding that a volunteer reserve deputy sher-
iff whom the county appoints to carry out law enforcement duties, who carries all
the devices and emblems of a law enforcement officer, and who answers calls in
the same manner as any police officer is not an "employee" for purposes of the
Texas Tort Claims Act).
173 See Bell, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 896 (stating that "the competent selection and
review of medical staff is precisely the type of professional service a hospital is li-
censed and expected to provide").
"" See Bost v. Riley, 262 S.E.2d 391, 396 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980) (stating that
hospital could be found negligent "for its failure to adequately investigate the
credentials of a physician selected to practice at the facility).
" See Joiner v. Mitchell County Hosp. Auth., 186 S.E.2d 307, 308 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1971) (failure of hospital to screen employee credentials constituted an act of
negligence on hospital's part distinct from physician's negligence), affd, 189 S.E.2d
412 (Ga. 1972); Welsh Mfg. v. Pinkerton's Inc., 474 A.2d 436, 441 (R.I. 1984)
(holding that "[wihen an employee is being hired for a sensitive occupation, mere
lack of negative evidence may not be sufficient to discharge the obligation of rea-
sonable care" but affirmative statements and background checks may be required);
Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hosp., 294 N.W.2d 501, 506 (Wis. Ct. App.
1980) (failure to check credentials upon application for admission to staff can lead
to hospital's liability), affd, 301 N.W.2d 156 (Wis. 1983).
"7 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 748, 758 (Ct. App. 1992).
'" Id.; see also Erickson v. Christenson, 781 P.2d 383, 384 (Or. Ct. App. 1989)
(holding that if church knew or should have known that pastor was not adequate-
ly trained as a counselor and had misused his position in the past to take advan-
tage of parishioners, it was reasonable for a trier of fact to infer that hiring the
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The Colorado Supreme Court, in Moses v. Diocese of Colo-
rado,"' expanded the employer's responsibility for pre-em-
ployment investigation to include more than just prior miscon-
duct. In Moses, a parishioner sued the diocese and a bishop for
negligent hiring and retention of a priest who had engaged in
a sexual relationship with a parishioner he had counselled.
The priest's personnel file with the diocese included psycholog-
ical reports noting his problems with depression, low self-es-
teem, and a "sexual identification ambiguity."'79 Although the
bishop and the diocese were aware of these reports, they were
withheld from the parish hiring body. 8 ' In finding that the
diocese and bishop owed a duty to the parishioner, the court
stated that liability for negligent hiring is not based on past
conduct alone but includes an examination by the employer of
character attributes that may create an undue risk of harm to
others who come into contact with the employee.'8 ' The court
expanded the duty to investigate on the basis of the priest's
position of trust and reliance as a counselor and the nature of
his contact with the public.'
pastor created the risk of harm to plaintiff and that this risk of harm was reason-
ably foreseeable to the church).
" 863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2153 (1994).
1 Id. at 315.
180 Id.
" Id. at 327 n.21; see also Biel v. Alcott, 876 P.2d 60 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993)
(noting the Restatement (Second) of Agency states: "Liability results ... not be-
cause of the relation of the parties, but because the employer antecedently had
reason to believe that an undue risk of harm would exist"). But see Schieffer v.
Catholic Archdiocese, 508 N.W.2d 907 (Neb. 1993). In Schieffer, the plaintiff was a
parishioner who saw defendant Lange for counseling. Lange engaged in sexual
conduct with her. Id. at 910. The court denied a claim for negligence stating that
the court would not entertain a claim for clergy malpractice. It would necessitate
that the court set standards for the church in violation of the Constitution. Id. at
912. The court then stated that the plaintiff had no cause of action against the
Archdiocese for negligent hiring, retention or supervision because the priest had
not been found liable of anything. Id. at 913.
182 Moses, 863 P.2d at 328. This duty is the same as that owed from hospitals
to patients. The hospital owes a duty to investigate potential employees or staff.
Under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-
11135 (1988), hospitals must check The National Practitioner Databank before
making a staff appointment. The records in this databank contain information on
physicians who have been disciplined or reprimanded, have had malpractice claims
brought against them, or have had privileges revoked or limited. A hospital is
held to have constructive knowledge of any information appearing in this databank
whether or not it actually checks the information. Health care groups also are re-
quired to report such information to their local boards who in turn report to the
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Liability may also fall on the employer who retains an
employee after becoming aware that the employee poses a risk
of harm to third parties. Hospitals, for example, may be liable
for failing to revoke the staff privileges of a physician when
hospital administrators become aware, or should become
aware, that the physician sexually abused patients."3 In
Copithorne v. Framingham Union Hospital,"4 the plaintiff,
an employee of the hospital, was raped by a visiting physician
staff member. After filing her complaint, the plaintiff became
aware that three similar complaints previously had been filed
against the same physician. One of the complaints had culmi-
nated in a criminal trial in which the physician was found not
guilty. Because the hospital received actual notice of the prior
assaults, the court held that it was foreseeable that the doctor
would continue to abuse patients and employees." Thus, a
jury could find that the risk of injury to the plaintiff due to the
doctor's continued employment was "within the [hospital's]
range of foreseeable consequences." 8 ' The court concluded
that the hospital could be liable for failing to take appropriate
remedial measures given its knowledge of the doctor's propen-
sities."'
Negligent supervision of employees is another theory un-
der which an employer may be held liable.'" For example, in
national board.
' This may include a duty to have proper chains of command for reporting
negligent or dangerous treatment by staff members. See Campbell v. Pitt County
Memorial Hosp., 352 SE.2d 902, 908-09 (N.C. Ct. App.), affd, 362 N.E.2d 273
(N.C. 1987).
By remaining silent once a report has been made, employers also may find
themselves criminally liable through aiding and abetting by silence. See Patrick J.
McNulty & Daniel J. Hanson, Liability for Aiding and Abetting by Silence or Inac-
tion: An Unfounded Doctrine, 29 TORT & INS. L.J. 14, 34 (1993) (noting that anal-
ogies to securities regulations have been made to find other types of non-disclo-
sures equivalent to aiding and abetting through silence).
520 N-E.2d 139 (Mass. 1988).
18 Id. at 140-42. After receiving the initial complaints, the hospital instructed
the doctor to have a chaperon present when visiting female patients and instruct-
ed the nurses on the floor to keep an eye on the doctor.
... Id. at 142.
17 Id. at 143. One member of the court expressed concern that the decision was
too far-reaching in establishing the hospital's duty "to protect its patients from the
criminal acts of independent physicians occurring off the premises and arising
from a private and independent doctor-patient relationship." Id. (dissenting opin-
ion).
"' The Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213 (1959), provides: "A person con-
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Andrews v. United States,189 the court found the therapist's
employer liable for negligent supervision where the plaintiffs
therapist engaged in sexual contact with her under the guise of
therapy. 9 ' Similarly, in Simmons v. United States,9' a so-
cial worker's supervisor knew that the counselor had engaged
in sexual relations with his client, yet took no action. 92 The
court found that proper supervision of the social worker would
have prevented a significant portion of the plaintiffs emotional
damages.193
While a court may find that an employer was negligent in
hiring, supervising, or retaining an employee, courts are still
bound by the rules of general negligence theory.' These
rules dictate that the employer's negligence be the proximate
cause of the plaintiffs injury.'95 If the employer negligently
hires an employee, but that employment is not the cause of the
plaintiffs injuries, courts will not find the employer liable. For
example, in Carter v. Skokie Valley Detective Agency, Ltd.,196
the plaintiff alleged that the defendant corporation was negli-
gent in hiring a security guard without performing a back-
ground check on him. The defendant's employee worked nights
at a gas station where the plaintiffs daughter worked as a
cashier. On a night when the security guard was off duty he
came to the gas station still dressed in his uniform. He told the
cashier that he was scheduled to work somewhere else that
night and asked her to give him a ride. After leaving together
in her car he kidnapped, raped and murdered her.'97
On appeal, Skokie Valley did not dispute its negligence in
hiring the guard. Instead, the defendant successfully argued
ducting an activity through servants or other agents is subject to liability for
harm resulting from his conduct if he is negligent or reckless . . . in the supervi-
sion of the activity."
732 F.2d 366 (4th Cir. 1984).
'o Id. at 370.
11 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1986).
12 Id. at 1364.
113 Id. at 1371.
4 For a discussion on the elements of the negligence cause of action, see gen-
erally Jorgenson et al., supra note 1, at 695-96.
" See Purcell v. Zimbelman, 500 P.2d 335 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972). Proximate
cause requires, at a minimum, a showing of "some reasonable connection" between
the act or omission of the entity and the plaintiff's injury. Id. at 342.
"6 628 N.E.2d 602 (Ill. Ct. App. 1993).
17 Id. at 603-04.
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there was no liability because hiring the guard had not been
the proximate cause of the victim's death. The court held that
the guard's employment "merely furnished a condition which
made the rape and murder possible, but [that] it was not the
result of 'a natural and continuous sequence of events' set in
motion by Skokie Valley's negligence and 'unbroken by any
effective intervening cause."'198
B. Institutional Breach of Fiduciary Duty
One of the most important components of the professional-
patient relationship is the degree of trust the patient places in
the professional. Because therapists, physicians, clergy and
other professionals occupy positions of respect and trust, they
owe a fiduciary duty to patients and clients to act in the
patient's or client's best interest.'99 Sexual contact between a
therapist and patient breaches the trust relationship and vio-
lates the therapist's duty of care."'
" Id. at 605 (quoting Escobar v. Madsen Constr. Co., 589 N.E.2d 638, 639 (IMl.
App. Ct. 1992)). The court explained its reasoning by stating that:
It was not the fact Harris was a security guard that got him into
Emma's car and proximately caused her injuries and death; it was the
fact that she trusted him because she knew him from work where he
happened to be employed as a security guard. In order to find liability in
this case, we would have to reason that if Skokie Valley had not negli-
gently hired Harris he would not have met Emma and she would not
have trusted him enough to let him into her car. If we followed such
reasoning then we would have had to find Skokie Valley liable if, after
leaving the Amoco station alone, she had seen him on the street out of
uniform and offered him a ride or if they ran into each other on a week-
end at the supermarket. We do not believe that the concept of proximate
cause should be extended this far.
Id. at 605-06.
"SS The Metro Action Committee on Public Violence Against Women and Chil-
dren ("METRAC") states that the most salient factors involved in a trust relation-
ship are age, authority, reliance or dependence, and emotional dependence.
METRAC, BREACH OF TRUST IN SEXUAL ASSAULT: STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM,
PART ONE 7-9 (1992); see also Erickson v. Christensen, 781 P.2d 383 (Or. 1989)
(stating that if clergypersons misuse their position as clergy and counselor, then
plaintiffs injuries stem from the misuse of a position of trust). In Destefano v.
Gabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 284 (Colo. 1988), the court held that when a therapist un-
dertakes to counsel another, a fiduciary duty is created. See also Rogers v. United
States, 397 F.2d 12, 14 (4th Cir. 1968) ("When an agency of the United States
voluntarily undertakes a task, it can be held to have accepted the duty of per-
forming that task with due care.").
... See Cosgrove, 520 A.2d 844, 848 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986) (stating
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When a therapist is employed by a professional institution,
the breach of the trust relationship may encompass not only
the therapist's initial breach, but also the failure of the em-
ployer to deal appropriately with that breach.2 1 The Metro
Action Committee on Public Violence Against Women and Chil-
dren defines this institutional breach of trust as:
When an individual who enjoys special status and bears special re-
sponsibility derived from a position within [a professional, governing
or religious] institution takes advantage of that position to commit
sexual abuse, the breach of trust aggravates the wrong. When the
institution does not respond in ways that recognize the abuse and
its impact, respect the rights of both victims and offenders, protect
and support the victim, and prevent further abuse by the same or
other offenders, the original breach of trust is compounded. If it fails
to care for the victim and serve her/his interests, or if it shields the
offender and itself, the institution is in breach of its societal
trust.
20 2
Individual employers and organizations owe a fiduciary
duty to clients or patients if they stand in a fiduciary relation-
ship to them.' This duty extends to a range of institutions.
For instance, in Vallinoto v. DiSandro,"4 the defendant law
firm was found to stand in a position of trust with respect to a
that the therapist who engaged in sexual contact with his patient betrayed his
trust as a therapist); see also Bunce v. Parkside Lodge, 596 N.E.2d 1106, 1111-12
(Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
201 METRAC, supra note 103, at 1; see also Rowe v. Bennett, 514 A.2d 802 (Me.
1986) (stating that the social worker who undertook psychotherapeutic treatment
and her employer and supervisor were under duty to provide proper care).
22 METRAC, supra note 103, at 3.
213 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874 cmt. a (1979), states that a fiduciary
relationship exists when one person is "under a duty to act or give advice for the
benefit of another upon matters within the scope of the relation."
Some courts have noted this institutional fiduciary duty without using the
terminology. In Richard H. v. Larry D., 243 Cal. Rptr. 807 (Ct. App. 1988), for
example, the court held that a clinic was liable for a therapist's sexual assault of
a patient. The court characterized the malpractice action against the therapist as
one for the breach of his "professional and fiduciary responsibilities." Id. at 810.
The court went on to state that because of the agency relationship between the
therapist and the hospital, "this cause of action is also good against the hospital,"
implying, but not holding, that the hospital owed the patients a fiduciary duty
because its employee was rendering treatment on its behalf. Id.
204 No. 91-0390 (R.I. Super. Ct. 1991), appeal docketed No. 93-379A (R.I. Super.
Ct. July 19, 1993). Verdict reported in The Providence Journal (Massachusetts ed.)
Nov. 20, 1992, at 1. See also Debra C. Moss, Jury Awards Ex-Client $225,000 for
Malpractice Despite Competent Representation, 79 A.B.A. J. 24 (1993).
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particular attorney's client. The Vallinoto jury found that a
member of the firm representing a female divorce client had
coerced his client into having sexual relations with him. As a
result of her lawyer's conduct, the plaintiff suffered physical
injury and severe emotional distress. Although the plaintiff
conceded that the attorney did "an excellent job" with respect
to obtaining assets during her divorce negotiations, DiSandro
deliberately had prolonged the divorce for eighteen months so
he could maintain his sexual relations with the plaintiff."5
The verdict was rendered against the individual attorney as
well as the attorney's law firm because the firm had violated
its duty to the client.06
In a similar case, Moses v. Diocese of Colorado,20 7 the
court found sufficient evidence to prove that a fiduciary rela-
tionship existed between a parishioner and the Diocese of Colo-
rado and its bishop.208 The parishioner's husband came to the
bishop to discuss the sexual contact between his wife and the
abusive priest.209 The husband agreed to let the bishop take
care of the matter and the bishop subsequently arranged to
meet with the abused parishioner.210 The bishop bound her to
secrecy but took no action to help the parishioner.21  The
bishop warned the abusive priest (who had been promoted to
another diocese) not to let the incident happen again.2 2
According to the court in Moses, the diocese and the bishop
had assumed a duty to the parishioner when he acted to re-
solve the problems between the parishioner and the abusive
priest.23 In finding that the bishop had assumed a duty to
help the parishioner, the court noted that "[o]nce a member of
the clergy accepts the parishioner's trust and accepts the role
of counsellor, a duty exists to act with the utmost good faith
for the benefit of the parishioner."24 Because the bishop and
other representatives of the diocese had done nothing to help
206 Id.
206 Id.
227 863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993); see supra notes 178-82 and accompanying text.
211 Id. at 321.
201 Id. at 315-18.
210 Id. at 317-18.
211 Id. at 18.
212 Moses, 863 P.2d at 18.
21 Id. at 322-23.
214 Id. at 323.
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the parishioner after having taken responsibility to do so, the
bishop and the diocese also had breached their fiduciary du-
ties.
15
C. Non-Delegable Duty Revisited
Neither the institutional negligence doctrine nor the insti-
tutional fiduciary theory holds an employer strictly liable for
injuries that occur during the course of the institution's busi-
ness. In determining institutional liability, courts initially
focus on whether the entity owed the plaintiff a duty of care
and base liability on the entity's breach of a specific duty.
216
An approach to liability that would encompass both the
fiduciary duty and institutional negligence under a strict liabil-
ity doctrine is the imposition of a non-delegable duty on health
care providers to supply a competent staff and to ensure
patients' safety. This view, allows the provider to delegate
client responsibility, but prohibits the transfer of liability for a
harmed client." Establishing such a strict liability encourag-
es hospital and health care providers to protect patients and to
act in the patients' best interests when rendering treatment.
In Thompson v. Nason Hospital,18 the Pennsylvania Su-
... The court noted that the diocese stood in a superior position to the parishio-
ner and was able to exert substantial influence over her. Id. at 322. The court
placed great emphasis on the fact that the diocese and the bishop assumed a duty
to act in the parishioner's best interests and then failed in that duty. Id. at 322-
23.
216 It is important to keep the institutional negligence theory separate from the
strict liability or respondeat superior theories. Pursuant to the institutional negli-
gence theory the entity owes an independent duty to the patient which it has
breached. Though this liability is not strict, the standard of care is very high, not
unlike the common carrier standard. In corporate negligence analysis, however,
courts require plaintiffs to show actual or constructive knowledge by the members
of the administration or board. Constructive knowledge is imputed to the board or
administration when one member knows or should know certain information.
Purcell v. Zimbelman, 500 P.2d 335, 34445 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972).
27 The Restatement (Second) of Agency § 214 (1959), entitled "Failure of Princi-
pal to Perform Non-delegable Duty," provides:
A master or other principal who is under a duty to provide protection for
or to have care used to protect others or their property and who confides
the performance of such duty to a servant or other person is subject to
liability to such others for harm caused to them by the failure of such
agent to perform the duty.
Id. 2,S 591 A.2d 703 (Pa. 1991); see suipra text accompanying nots 109-10.
[Vol. 60: 1421
EMPLOYER LIABILITY
preme Court followed this approach and defined institutional
negligence as a non-delegable duty of care.219 The Thompson
court set the hospital's standard of care owed to patients as
one that "ensure[s] the patient's safety and well-being while at
the hospital."22 This definition implies that a patient need
not establish the negligence of a third party, such as a doctor
or nurse, to find the hospital liable.22' The court emphasized
that liability was imposed upon the hospital-and not against
a third party or against the hospital vicariously-because of its
own direct breach."22
The modern view of the hospital as a full-service care
provider with direct responsibilities to the patients, rather
than merely a provider of support services such as tools and
operating rooms, was established first in Darling v. Charleston
Community Memorial Hospital.' As discussed above, this
landmark case recognized the new relationship emerging be-
tween hospitals and patients. Darling was among the first
cases to view the hospital as an entity that owed a direct duty
of care to its patients. Hospitals now are responsible for taking
reasonable steps to ensure the safety of their patients.
Other courts have followed Darling's lead, finding that the
duty of care hospitals owe to their patients cannot be delegated
away. Some courts have limited this duty to the emergency
room setting, stating that hospitals had assumed an implied
duty to protect the patients in this context. 4 In Jackson v.
Power,' for example, the court held that a hospital that had
offered emergency room services as required for state accredi-
tation, could not delegate its responsibility for emergency room
... The court stated that the standard "creates a non-delegable duty which the
hospital owes directly to a patient." Id. (emphasis added); see also McClellan v.
HMO, 604 A.2d 1053, 1059-60 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
220 Thompson, 591 A.2d at 707.
221 Id.
222 The court acknowledged creation of this new standard when it stated,
"[tloday, we take a step beyond the hospital's duty of care delineated in [another
case, which recognized the doctrine of corporate negligence and corporate liability]
in full recognition of the corporate hospital's role in the total health care of its
patients." Id. at 708.
2 211 N.E.2d 253 (IlI. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
224 In many cases there is an overlap between vicarious liability based on the
apparent agency and agency by estoppel theories and direct liability based on the
non-delegable duty theory. See Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376 (Alaska 1987).
22 743 P.2d 1376 (Alaska 1987); see supra text accompanying notes 126-27.
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patients. In Jackson, the court applied the non-delegable duty
analysis to find the hospital strictly liable for negligent treat-
ment performed on the plaintiff in its emergency room. 6
This type of analysis indicates how courts have progressed
toward assigning strict liability.
Other courts have not limited the non-delegable duty to
emergency rooms but have applied it to any "inherent fimction"
of the hospitalY7 The inherent function rationale is analo-
gous to the enterprise liability theory.' When a function is
inherent in the operation of an enterprise, the enterprise
should be required to bear any losses associated with its per-
formance.
Cases holding hospitals liable for acts by independent
doctors performing inherent functions of the hospital have not
necessarily relied on a clear non-delegable duty rationale. In
Beeck v. Tucson General Hospital, 9 for example, the court
held that an individual who performs an inherent function of
the hospital acts as an agent of the hospital and thus subjects
the hospital to liability. The court focused on the non-delegable
responsibilities involved in the performance of an inherent
function and stated that when a hospital has undertaken a
duty to provide a service, it must do so with a commensurate
accordance standard of care and responsibility. Although the
tasks themselves may be delegated, the responsibility may
notY.0
The inherent function theory has been described in terms
of an agency relationship. The court in Schagrin v. Wilmington
Medical Center"' described the inherent function theory as
22 Jackson, 743 P.2d at 1382-85. Though the court was deciding the issue of
whether a hospital may be held vicariously liable for negligent health care ren-
dered by independent emergency room doctors, it held that the hospital had a
non-delegable duty to provide non-negligent emergency room care.
22 An "inherent function' is one without which the hospital could not properly
achieve its purpose. Beeck v. Tucson Gen'l Hosp., 500 P.2d 1153, 1158 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1972) (finding duties of radiologist to constitute "inherent functions" of hospi-
tal).
"s When an employee delivers a service that is an inherent function of the
hospital, that employee can be looked upon "as an integral part of the total 'hospi-
tal enterprise.'" Adamski v. Tacoma Gen'l Hosp., 579 P.2d 970, 977 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1978).
2" 500 P.2d 1153 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972).
2" Id. at 1157.
"2 304 A.2d 61 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973).
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such but used reasoning similar to the non-delegable duty
theory. In Schagrin, the court stated that "when one has un-
dertaken to do a certain thing or to do it in a particular man-
ner, he cannot, by employing an independent contractor, avoid
liability for injury resulting from a nonperformance of duties
assumed by the independent contractor under his agree-
ment." 2 In effect, the court employed the non-delegable du-
ty/inherent function analysis.
The Supreme Court of Washington recognized the doctrine
of institutional negligence in Pedroza v. Bryant,' describing
it as encompassing a non-delegable duty owed by the hospital
to the patient.' Previously the court had viewed the inher-
ent function theory only as a way to avoid the respondeat su-
perior requirements;' for example, using it to affix vicarious
liability on an entity for an independent contractor's acts. 6
In the Pedroza case, the court employed the corporate negli-
gence doctrine to impose direct liability on hospitals, going so
far as to make that liability a non-delegable one. 7 The
court, therefore, adopted the view that an institution that
engages an independent contractor to perform an inherent
function, without which the entity could not properly achieve
its purpose, remains responsible for any resulting harmy
The California Court of Appeals similarly implied that
hospitals owed a duty to their patients to ensure their safety
while at the hospital-yet without using the term non-delega-
ble duty. Deciding the issue of what constituted professional
negligence, the court in Murillo v. Good Samaritan Hospi-
tal 9 noted that the hospital's professional duty "is primarily
to provide a safe environment within which diagnosis, treat-
232 Id. at 64; see also Adamski, 579 P.2d at 977 (discussing the "ostensible
agent" theory set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 267).
677 P.2d 166 (Wash. 1984).
21 Id. at 168.
" Id. at 169; see also Adamski, 579 P.2d at 977.
26 677 P.2d at 169.
27 Id. at 170.
" Id. The court defined the standard of care to which the hospital is held as
the accreditation standards promulgated by the Joint Commission on Accreditation
of Hospitals as well as the hospital's own bylaws adopted pursuant thereto. Id. at
170-71.
" 160 Cal. Rptr. 33 (Ct. App. 1979).
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ment, and recovery can be carried out."24
This notion of a non-delegable duty of protection is similar
to the innkeeper or common-carrier duty.41 The non-delega-
ble duty theory emphasizes the fact that patients must rely on
the hospital to protect them from employees or others who
have access to their rooms and bodies.242 Once patients have
submitted themselves to the care of the hospital they have
little control over their environment. The hospital therefore is
ultimately responsible for their safety.24" The non-delegable
duty theory, with respect to inherent functions, imposes on the
hospital a duty owed directly to the patient "regardless of the
details of the doctor-hospital relationship."244 When a patient
is harmed due to the hospital's negligence or its failure to
enforce rules and regulations, the hospital has breached its
duty.245
If an employee harms a third party, the employer may be
liable to the third party for its employee's failure to meet the
employer's own duty toward that party. Institutional negli-
gence doctrine holds employers directly liable for failing to
investigate potential employees or agents properly, to ade-
quately supervise them once chosen, or to terminate them once
notice of improper conduct is received. Such liability stems
from the employer's direct duty to the client or patient. In
some situations, institutions have been found to owe an even
higher fiduciary duty to their clients and patients. Employers
cannot assume that diligent hiring practices will make them
immune to liability. They must be as diligent in their supervi-
sory, disciplinary and retention practices as in their hiring
practices, and must be fully cognizant of the duties owed di-
rectly to patients and clients.
2"0 Id. at 36-37.
24 See supra notes 128-58 and accompanying text.
242 For example, in G.L. v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 757 P.2d 1347, 1354 (Or.
1988), the court reviewed the applicable regulations regarding hospitals that stated
that patients' rooms were to remain unlocked at all times to ensure easy access
from the hall without a key.
Murillo, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 36-37.
244 Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166, 168 (Wash. 1984).
24 Id. at 170; see also Murillo, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
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III. MISCELLANEOUS LIABILITY CONSIDERATIONS
A. Protective Legislation
Aside from typical employer liability situations, other
methods of imposing liability in fiduciary misconduct cases
include statutory reporting requirements, obligations between
a supervisor and supervisee, and HMOs' liability for their
affiliates' acts. At least three states-Minnesota, Illinois and
Texas-have enacted legislation aimed at requiring employers
to take steps to prevent or report sexual contact between ther-
apist employees and patients. These statutes provide examples
of the protective legislation in force in the United States.
The Minnesota statute places substantial responsibility on
employers to protect patients from sexually exploitative thera-
pists through specific, mandatory hiring and supervising proce-
dures.246 The statute requires employers to disclose informa-
The Minnesota statute states:
(a) An employer of a psychotherapist may be liable under section 148.02
[cause of action for sexual exploitation] if:
(1) the employer fails or refuses to take reasonable action when
the employer knows or has reason to know that the psychothera-
pist engaged in sexual contact with the plaintiff or any other pa-
tient or former patient of the psychotherapist; or
(2) the employer fails or refuses to make inquiries of an employer
or former employer, whose name and address have been disclosed
to the employer and who employed the psychotherapist as a psy-
chotherapist within the last five years, concerning the occurrence of
sexual contacts by the psychotherapist with patients or former
patients of the psychotherapist.
(b) An employer or former employer of a psychotherapist may be liable
under section 148.02 if the employer or former employer:
(1) knows of the occurrence of sexual contact by the psychothera-
pist with patients or former patients of the psychotherapist;
(2) receives a specific written request by another employer or pro-
spective employer of the psychotherapist, engaged in the business
of psychotherapy, concerning the existence or nature of the sexual
contact; and
(3) fails or refuses to disclose the occurrence of the sexual contacts.
(c) An employer or former employer may be liable under section 148.02
only to the extent that the failure or refusal to take any action required
by paragraph (a) or (b) was a proximate and actual cause of any damag-
es sustained.
(d) No cause of action arises, nor may a licensing board in this state
take disciplinary action, against a psychotherapist's employer or former
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tion regarding former employees to prospective employers.24 7
Employers who fail to perform proper investigations prior to
hiring therapists or who fail to handle incidents of employee
sexual misconduct properly are subject to statutory liabili-
ty.248 In addition, the statute creates a cause of action against
a therapist's employer when the employee fails to take reason-
able action when the employer knows or has reason to know
that the therapist has engaged in sexual contact with a patient
or former patient.249 The Minnesota statute defines a "former
patient" as one who was a patient of the psychotherapist with-
in two years prior to the sexual contact.Y°
In Minnesota the statute's effects on the therapeutic com-
munity were felt immediately." 1 Many employers, including
churches and evaluating pastors, began sending letters of in-
quiry regarding job applicants and keeping files on past em-
ployees after their departure. 2 Such actions on the part of
employers curb the problem of repeat offenders who by chang-
ing jobs leave no traceable record of sexual misconduct. The
statute also encourages employers to disclose information to
prospective employers, 3 a crucial element in protecting fu-
ture patients and subsequent employers.
The Illinois statute also creates a cause of action against
employers who fail to take reasonable action regarding sexual
contact between therapist/employees and their patients or
former patients.' Under the Illinois statute a "former pa-
tient" is one who received psychotherapy from the therapist
employer who in good faith complies with this section.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 148A.03.
247 Id. § 148A.03(b)(2).
28 Id. § 148A.03(a).
241 Id. § 148A.03.
2" Id. § 148A.01(3).
2"1 See SCHOENER ET AL., supra note 3, at 538-40 (discussing reaction to the
Minnesota statute).
252 SCHOENER ET AL., supra note 3, at 539.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 148A.03(b).
25 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140, para. 1. The statute, in relevant part, states:
§ 3 Liability of employer. An employer of a psychotherapist may be lia-
ble under Section 2 [cause of action for sexual exploitation] if the em-
ployer fails or refuses to take reasonable action when the employer
knows or has reason to know that the psychotherapist engaged in sexual
contact with the plaintiff or any other patient or former patient of the
psychotherapist.
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within one year prior to the sexual contact with the thera-
pistY5 A flaw in both the Minnesota and Illinois statutes is
their failure to include a definition of what constitutes "reason-
able action" on the part of an employer." The result of the
vagueness of this requirement is that it may be difficult to
prove that an employer's action was not reasonable.
Legislation enacted by Texas to impose a duty on employ-
ers to respond to actual or possible sexual contact by their
employee-therapists and current or former patients provides
the specific means to fulfill this duty." Like Minnesota, the
" Id. ch. 140, para. 1(b).
21 See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140, para. 3; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 148A.03.
2 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 81. The section that deals with the
liability of the employer reads in relevant part:
(a) An employer of a mental health services provider is liable to a pa-
tient or former patient of the . . . provider for damages if the patient or
former patient is injured as described by section 81.002 [Sexual exploita-
tion cause of action] and the employer:
(1) fails to make inquiries of an employer for former employer,
whose name and address have been disclosed to the employer and
who employed the . . . provider within the five years before the
date of disclosure, concerning the possible occurrence of sexual
exploitation by the . .. provider of patients or former patients of
the . . . provider; or
(2) knows or has reason to know that the ... provider engaged in
the sexual exploitation of the patient or former patient and the
employer failed to:
(A) report the suspected sexual exploitation as required by
Section 81.006 [Duty to report]; or
(B) take necessary action to prevent or stop the sexual ex-
ploitation by the . .. provider.
(b) An employer or former employer of a ... provider is liable to a pa-
tient or former patient of the . . . provider for damages if the patient or
former patient is injured as described by Section 81.002 and the employ-
er or former employer.
(1) knows of the occurrence of the sexual exploitation by the . . .
provider of the patient or former patient;
(2) receives a specific request by an employer or prospective em-
ployer of the . . . provider, engaged in the business of providing
mental health services, concerning the possible existence or nature
of sexual exploitation by the . .. provider; and
(3) fails to disclose the occurrence of the sexual exploitation.
(c) An employer or former employer is liable under this section only to
the extent that the failure to take the action described by subsection (a)
or (b) was a proximate and actual cause of damages sustained.
Id. § 81.003. The duty to report reads in pertinent part:
(a) If a mental health services provider or the employer of a . . . provid-
er has reasonable cause to suspect that a patient has been the victim of
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Texas statute requires employers to investigate potential
employees' prior sexual misconduct before hiring them by re-
questing such information from their former employers.Y
Former employers are required to respond to prospective
employers' inquiries and to answer all questions regarding any
occurrence of sexual contact between the therapist in question
and any former or current patientsY9
The statute also requires employers to take appropriate
action when they know or suspect sexual contact between an
employee-therapist and that therapist's patient or former pa-
tient .2 " The statute allows former patients to bring their ac-
tions by proving their emotional dependence on the mental
health professional at the time the sexual exploitation
began261 and requires that the sexual exploitation must have
started within two years of the termination of the mental
health services.2 12 The employer cannot be held liable if these
conditions are not met.263 The Texas statute also requires em-
ployers to report suspected as well as actual sexual contact to
the county prosecuting attorney and to any state mental health
licensing board.2
Texas' statute is broader than that of Minnesota and Illi-
nois because it includes clergy members. Liability for the acts
the sexual exploitation by a . . . provider during the course of treatment,
or if a patient alleges sexual exploitation by a . .. provider during the
course of treatment, the . . . provider or the employer shall report the
alleged conduct not later than the 30th day after the date the person
became aware of the conduct or the allegations to:
(1) the prosecuting attorney in the county in which the alleged
sexual exploitation occurred, and
(2) any state licensing board that has responsibility for the...
provider's licensing.
(e) A person who intentionally violates subsection (a) or (d) [privileged
information] is subject to disciplinary action by that person's appropriate
licensing board and also commits an offense. An offense under this sub-
section is a Class C misdemeanor.
Id. § 81.006.
"' Id. § 81.003(a)(1).
29 Id. § 81.003(b).
260 Id. § 81.003(a)(2)(B).
211 Id. § 81.005(b).
212 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 81.005(b).
263 Id.
264 Id. § 81.006(a).
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of a clergy member providing mental health services is limited
to the church, congregation or parish in which the clergy
member carried out his or her pastoral duties."' Minnesota
does not make this distinction.
As these statutes demonstrate, legislatures have begun to
recognize the problem of therapist abuse and respond with
legislation aimed at preventing or punishing it. These statutes
also demonstrate legislators' increasing awareness that em-
ployers can be powerful agents in the prevention of abuse.
While not all states have such legislation, Texas, Illinois and
Minnesota demonstrate a trend among states toward prevent-
ing employers from escaping liability for abuse perpetrated by
their employees.
" The Texas statute states:
If a mental health professional who sexually exploits a patient of former
patient is a member of the clergy and the sexual exploitation occurs
when the professional is acting as a member of the clergy, liability if any
under this section, is limited to the church, congregation, or parish in
which the member of the clergy carried out the clergy member's pastoral
duties:
(1) at the time the sexual exploitation occurs, if the liability is
based on a violation of Subsection (a); or
(2) at the time of the previous occurrence of sexual exploitation, if
the liability is based on a violation of Subsection (b) [fails to re-
spond to a request for information].
TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 81.003(d). Section 81.003(e) states:
Nothing in subsection (d) shall prevent the extension of liability under
this section beyond the local church, congregation, or parish where the
current or previous sexual exploitation occurred, as appropriate under
subsection (d), if the patient proves that officers or employees of the
religious denomination in question at the regional, state, or national
level:
(1) knew or should have known of the occurrences of sexual exploi-
tation by the mental health services provider;
(2) received reports of such occurrences and failed to take neces-
sary action to prevent or stop such sexual exploitation by the . . .
provider and that such failure was a proximate and actual cause of
the damages; or
(3) knew or should have known of the mental health professional's
propensity to engage in sexual exploitation.
Id. § 81.003(e).
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B. Supervisor Liability
1. Therapists
Therapists often employ consultants or supervisors to
review their therapeutic techniques or to provide advice re-
garding particular clients or cases. Several legal theories ad-
dress how and when such consultants and supervisors may be
liable for the therapists to whom they provide their services.
For liability purposes, the distinction between a consultant and
a supervisor is important:
Consultation implies an arrangement in which an outside clinician
is invited to provide information to the clinician with responsibility
for the patient's care without assuming any clinical responsibility for
the case.... In contrast, in a supervisory relationship the supervi-
sor shares some degree of responsibility for the patient's care flow-
ing from the structure of the situation rather than from an
invitation. 6'
Consultant relationships often are educational in na-
ture.267 The consultant makes suggestions to the therapist
that the therapist is free to accept or reject. In contrast, super-
visory relationships most often occur in formal training pro-
grams where the supervisory clinician has ultimate responsi-
bility for the outcome of the case (often evidenced by the
supervisor's billing the patient)."' In supervisory situations,
the treating therapist is not free to ignore the supervisor's
suggestions or instructions.
The American Psychiatric Association issued guidelines
stating that in supervisory relationships the supervising psy-
chiatrist retains direct responsibility for the patient's care,
giving professional direction and active guidance to the treat-
ing therapist.6 9 The guidelines specify that consultants, in
contrast, generally do not assume the same degree of responsi-
216 PAUL APPELBAUM & THOMAS GUTHEIL, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY
AND THE LAW 201 (2d ed. 1991).
267 Id.
268 Id.
2R ROBERT SIMON & ROBERT SADOFF, PSYCHIATRIC MALPRACTICE, CASES AND
COMMENTS FOR CLINICIANS 34-35 (1992) (quoting the American Psychiatric
Association's Guidelines for Psychiatrists in Consultative, Supervisory, or Collabo-
rative Relationships with Non-Medical Therapists).
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bility. Instead, they merely offer observations and professional
opinions that the practitioner is not obligated to acceptY0
Health insurance carriers have also acknowledged the
nature of supervisory relationships and have written rules to
address these relationships. Blue Shield of Massachusetts, for
example, will cover only those charges incurred by care provid-
ers for services performed under their direct supervision."
Sexual misconduct cases involving supervisee practitioners
and their patients present a variety of policy concerns over
supervisors' liability. For example, one could argue that pun-
ishing a supervisor who did not actually engage in the sexual
activity will not deter the abusive therapist at all. On the other
hand, holding supervisors responsible for the acts of
supervisees will cause supervisors to be more diligent in their
supervision.
2. Physicians
Supervisor liability also may create vicarious lability on an
attending non-employee doctor for misconduct by nurses and
270 Id. The issue of case consultation versus supervision is complicated by the
fact that historically, in the counseling and psychotherapy fields, practitioners have
used, and continue to use, the term "supervision" to describe case consultation.
Many private practitioners purchase "supervision," which involves periodic meetings
with a "supervisor," who is actually a consultant, during which the practitioner
shares clinical material which is of concern. The supervisor may not even know of
the existence of any more than a few of the clients being treated. SCHOENER ET
AL., supra note 3, at 279-80.
21 The Rules state:
Rule 2. Generally, Blue Shield will pay a participating provider for
services performed by an assistant: ... (c) who performs the services
under the direct, personal and continuous supervision of a Blue Shield
participating provider who practices in the same or related field;
"Direct, personal and continuous supervision" under this Rule means that
the participating provider must perform or participate in an initial exam-
ination or evaluation of the patient and actively participate in the con-
tinuing management of the patient's treatment. While the provider need
not be in the room where the assistant renders his or her services, that
provider must be on the same premises and immediately available to
provide personal assistance and direction. Availability by telephone or
other electronic communication does not constitute direct, personal and
continuous supervision. The participating provider must also document
his/her supervision of assistants in the clinical record of the patient.
BLUE SHIELD OF MASSACHUSETTS, INC., RULES AND REGULATIONS (1988).
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ty then extends only to the doctor, although the hospital may
be liable under other theories. 2
Under the borrowed-servant and captain-of-the-ship doc-
trines a physician who exerts control over or supervises the
support staff ultimately is responsible for patient care. In
Hoffman v. Wells,273 the plaintiff sued a doctor and a hospital
for injuries resulting from negligently performed surgery. 4
The court dismissed the claim against the hospital for the
actions of the support personnel and instead held the doctor
responsible for the staff member's negligence.2 75 The court
reasoned that because the hospital had loaned its employee to
the physician, the physician had controlled the employee's
actions and had become vicariously liable for the employee's
negligence. 6
The borrowed-servant and captain-of-the-ship doctrines,
both rules of vicarious liability, are premised on the doctor's
supervisory position in the operating room. Although both
doctrines still exist, courts recently have turned away from
strict interpretations of them, instead moving toward imposing
liability on the person with actual control over the staff mem-
bers. Recognizing the limited scope of a physician's actual
control over staff members-as opposed to the physician's ap-
parent control and necessary reliance on the members of the
health care team-courts have also begun to impose joint doc-
tor-hospital liability.2 7
7
212 See ABA SECTION OF TORTS & INSURANCE, PRACTICE LIABILITY ISSUES FOR
HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT A-137 (1994) [hereinafter
ABA-TIPS].
27- 397 S.E.2d 696 (Ga. 1990).
274 Id. at 698.
27 A stricter "borrowed servant" rule holds the physician responsible for any act
which the doctor has the right to control, whether or not control was actually
exercised. ABA-TIPS, supra note 272, at A-137.
27 Hoffman, 397 S.E.2d at 697-98; see also Rudeck v. Wright, 709 P.2d 621
(Mont. 1985) (holding attending surgeon liable for negligent actions of sponge
nurse).
27 ABA-TIPS, supra note 272, at A-138; see also Darling v. Charleston Commu-
nity Memorial Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965) (discussing hospital's overall obli-
gation to supervise quality of patient care services), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946
(1965).
Similar to the joint liability of hospitals and physicians, associates practicing
together in a clinic or other office setting may also be held liable for an individual
member's misconduct. See Van Dyke v. Bixby, 448 N.E.2d 353 (Mass. 1983) (hold-
ing association liable for acts of associate). In Van Dyke, for example, the court
1476 [Vol. 60: 1421
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C. HMOs: Special Considerations
The legal community has begun looking at HMOs in much
the same manner as it does hospitals in imposing liability.
HMOs are managed care systems that combine the features of
health care organizations with those of health insurance pro-
viders. HMOs come in many forms but all feature a compre-
hensive approach to health care coverage and delivery. Wheth-
er by choice or necessity many Americans now obtain their
health care services through H-MOs."' Because the growth of
HMOs is relatively recent, courts have not had the opportunity
to fully address the issue of HMO liability.
The various types of HMOs have organizational differences
that could effect decisions regarding organizational liability.
Currently, five common types of HMOs exist in the health care
market. The Staff Model HMO typically employs health care
providers directly and provides services at HMO-owned facili-
ties."9 Many group health plans represent this traditional
HMO model." ° The Group Model HMO contracts with a sin-
gle group practice to provide primary and specialty care ser-
vices to clients.2"' The group is a "closed" panel that chooses
its own members. 2  The Direct Contract Model HMO con-
tracts directly with individual physicians and groups, generally
requiring each enrollee to designate a primary care physician
from their list to coordinate the patient's medical care and to
control referrals. The HMO may pay the physicians on either a
fee-for-service basis or a primary care capitation basis.283 An
held that medical partners are ordinarily jointly liable for the individual partners'
malpractice. Id. at 355. The court in Ruane v. Cooper, 127 A.D.2d 524, 512
N.Y.S.2d 38 (1st Dep't 1987), adopted a similar view but focused on the manner in
which the doctors had held themselves out to the public. The patient Ruane had
met with two physicians of the practice, but had received treatment from only one.
Yet the two physicians held themselves out as a joint venture, and therefore each
was held liable for the other's malpractice. Id. at 525, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 39.
278 Jane Birnbaum, Health Care Plans of a New Generation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6,
1993, § 1, at 39; Robert Pear, The Health Care Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1994,
at A12.
" ABA-TIPS, supra note 272, at A-46.
28 ABA-TIPS, supra note 272, at A-46.
281 ABA-TIPS, supra note 272, at A-46.
22 ABA-TIPS, supra note 272, at A-46.
2 ABA-TIPS, supra note 272, at A-47. A per capita fee is based upon the total
number of subscribers to the HMO rather than payment for the actual service
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Individual Practice Association ("IPA") HMO contracts with
individual physicians or groups of physicians who belong to a
separate legal entity-the IPA." Physicians provide medical
care in their own offices and may maintain separate private
practices.285 The HMOs usually pay the IPAs on an all-inclu-
sive capitation basis, but may also choose to pay on a set per-
centage of premium fee.286 IPAs are usually open to any phy-
sician who meets the credentials requirements set by the
IPA." 7 The Network Model HMO contracts with a combina-
tion of medical groups, IPAs and other providers to provide
health care to HMO subscribers.288 The HMO usually com-
pensates these individuals and groups on an all-inclusive phy-
sician capitation basis.289
Depending on the type of HMO involved, liability may be
imposed in the same manner as it is on hospitals or other
health care organizations. An HMO's liability may be vicarious
by the theories of respondeat superior, ostensible agency or
agency by estoppel, job-created authority, or common carrier
liability. Alternatively HMO liability may be direct on the
basis of negligent hiring, supervision and credentialing, breach
of institutional fiduciary duty, or breach of a nondelegable duty
of care.
An HMO can be vicariously liable on the basis of responde-
at superior for the acts of a physician associated with it."'
For example, the court in Sloan v. Metro Health Council, held
that a staff model HMO could be vicariously liable for its
physicians' acts, stating that where the usual requisites of
agency or an employer-employee relationship exist, a corpora-
tion may be held vicariously liable for the acts of its employee-
physicians.29' The court based its decision on the following
circumstances: the HMO physicians received an annual salary
provided.
"' ABA-TIPS, supra note 272, at A-47.
2' ABA-TIPS, supra note 272, at A-47.
28. ABA-TIPS, supra note 272, at A-47.
287 ABA-TIPS, supra note 272, at A-47.
28 ABA-TIPS, supra note 272, at A-48.
28. ABA-TIPS, supra note 272, at A-90.
'o Sloan v. Metropolitan Health Council, 516 N.E.2d 1104 (Ind. 1987).
29 Id. at 1109; see also Schleier v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, 876 F.2d
174 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding HMO vicariously liable on the basis of respondeat
superior for acts of its consultant physicians).
1478 [Vol. 60:1421
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and benefits, could not work outside the HMO without consent,
and final authority rested in the supervising HMO medical
director. The court noted that the HMO had advertised itself
as a complete health care system "employing" the participating
physicians. 2
HMOs have also been found vicariously liable for acts of
their apparent or ostensible agents. In Boyd v. Albert Einstein
Medical Center,29 the plaintiff sued the IPA model HMO for
malpractice that led to his wife's death. The defendant HMO
contracted to provide health care to its subscribers, selected
the physicians with whom it associated, and conducted a re-
view process before admitting them. 94 The HMO promulgat-
ed extensive rules regarding patient selection of doctors and
referrals,2 95 and member patients paid the HMO for care who
then paid the doctors on a capitation basis."' The court held
that the patient reasonably looked to the HMO rather than to
the particular physician for treatment and the HMO, in turn,
had held the physician out as its agent.97 The court found all
the factors required for ostensible agency in this relationship
and held the HMO vicariously liable for the physician's negli-
gence.
298
In McClellan v. HMO of Pennsylvania,299 a primary care
physician whom the plaintiffs wife had chosen from a list pro-
vided by the HMO, 0° performed a biopsy on a mole but failed
to send the biopsied material to a lab for examination.'O The
patient subsequently died from a malignant melanoma.0 2
2 Sloan, 516 N.E.2d at 1105. The physicians entered into an "employment
contract" whereby the HMO was the "employer" and the physician was the "em-
ployee." Id.
' 547 A.2d 1229 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
294 Id. at 1232-33.
' Id. at 1233.
296 Id. at 1233-34.
217 Id. at 1234-35.
29 547 A.2d at 1235; see also Dunn v. Praiss, 606 A.2d 862 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1992). But see Raglin v. HMO, 595 N.E.2d 153, 156 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)
(holding an IPA-model HMO was not vicariously liable under an ostensible agency
theory because HMO played only an administrative role in the health care deliv-
ery process); Chase v. Independent Practice Ass'n, 583 N.E.2d 251 (Mass. App. Ct.
1991) (holding an IPA-model HMO not liable under a theory of ostensible agency).
1 604 A.2d 1053 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
"29 Id. at 1054.
30' Id. at 1055.
2S2 Id.
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The court held that an HMO has a non-delegable duty to its
subscribers to select and retain only competent primary care
physicians. The modified IPA model HMO could be liable for
the negligence of a primary care physician whom it had negli-
gently hired or failed to terminate.33
HMOs may also be responsible for the negligent acts of
caregivers under misrepresentation or breach of contract theo-
ries."4 Advertisements or brochures that state or imply that
affiliated doctors are employees of the organization or are
trained in specialties may open HMOs to liability. An HMO
may make statements in an advertisement intended to lead
future patients to believe that its affiliated doctors are employ-
ees of the HMO or that they possess certain qualities that
allow them to affiliate themselves with the HMO. Such repre-
sentations, if false, can lead to HMO liability for misrepresen-
tation or for breach of contract or breach of warranty.3 5
The cases involving theories of vicarious liability or direct
corporate liability demonstrate that courts are appropriately
beginning to treat HMOs in the same way they do hospitals.
HMOs are not merely structures or administrative groups that
help patients find doctors. HMOs are profit-making entities
that provide subscribers with a limited number of physicians
and regulated health insurance. Just as patients rely on their
hospitals, HMO subscribers rely on the HMO entity for their
health care. Some courts have begun to hold these organiza-
tions accountable for that relationship.
" Id. at 1059. The court stated that to state a cause of action under section
323 against an IPA-model HMO, a complaint must contain factual allegations suf-
ficient to establish the legal requirement that the HMO has undertaken
(1) [tlo render services to the plaintiff subscriber, (2) which the HMO
should recognize as necessary for the protection of its subscriber, (3) that
the HMO failed to exercise reasonable care in selecting, retaining, and/or
evaluating the plaintiffs primary care physician, and (4) that as a result
of the HMO's failure to use such reasonable care, the risk of harm to the
subscriber was increased.
Id.
34 See Raglin v. HMO, 595 N.E.2d 153, 156 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (reviewing case
law and stating that potential exists for HMOs to be held liable for medical mal-
practice based on tort theories, including respondeat superior or ostensible agency
and corporate negligence based upon negligent selection and control of doctors or
independent acts of the HMO, and contract theories, including breach of contract
and breach of warranty).
3" Id. at 156.
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CONCLUSION
Employers can be held either vicariously liable for the acts
of employees or directly liable for their own negligence. Under
the theory of respondeat superior, an employer is liable for the
acts of an employee that are within the employee's scope of
employment or for which the motivation is to serve the employ-
er. Various jurisdictions interpret the motivation test different-
ly and modify it accordingly. Some jurisdictions rely on the
Restatement test requiring in addition to a motivation to serve
that the act take place within work-related time and space lim-
its.
Courts are beginning to explore the theory of job-created
authority by holding employers liable for the acts of employees
outside the scope of employment on the basis of the job author-
ity vested in the employee. This theory of liability could prove
to be fertile ground for plaintiffs in sexual abuse cases because
therapists, physicians and other professionals exert at least
apparent authority over their patients and clients.
Courts have found independent contractors to be employ-
ees in situations where the employer has held the contractor
out as its agent and where the client or patient has reasonably
relied on this representation. Supervisory personnel, consul-
tants and seemingly independent agents associated with health
maintenance organizations ultimately also are tied to institu-
tions for liability purposes.
Employers often are held directly liable for their own neg-
ligence in hiring, supervising, and retaining employees whose
actions harm third parties. Some jurisdictions recognize that
the institution itself owes a fiduciary duty to clients or pa-
tients. Other jurisdictions also recognize that the duty of care
owed by an institution is a non-delegable duty.
Given the fact that abusive therapists have often abused
in the past and continue to practice only because of the silence
or tacit approval of other therapists or employers, it behooves
the plaintiffs attorney to closely examine the employment, con-
sulting or supervisory relationships in which the therapist is
functioning.
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